NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAVID ERIC BUSHLOW, No. 18-16687 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-06771-VKD v. MEMORANDUM* MTC FINANCIAL, INC., DBA Trustee Corp, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Virginia K. DeMarchi, Magistrate Judge, Presiding** Submitted May 21, 2019*** Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

David Eric Bushlow appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). claims against the foreclosure trustee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bushlow’s FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because Bushlow failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant’s conduct was unfair or unconscionable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (prohibiting unfair or unconscionable conduct in enforcing a security interest); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing protections for borrowers set forth in § 1692f(6)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Bushlow’s remaining FDCPA claims because defendant is not a debt collector except under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holtus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2019) (“[B]ut for § 1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors within the meaning of the [FDCPA].”); Dowers, 852 F.3d at 970 (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity,

2 18-16687 it does so only through Section 1692f(6)”).

AFFIRMED.

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