U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2019

Apriori Technologies, Inc. v. Charles Broquard

Apriori Technologies, Inc. v. Charles Broquard
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Decided July 23, 2019

Apriori Technologies, Inc. v. Charles Broquard

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 23 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT aPRIORI TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a No. 17-56772 Delaware Corporation, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-09561-JAK-KS Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEMORANDUM* CHARLES JEROME BROQUARD, Defendant-Appellant, and REID DOUGLAS FIELD, Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 15, 2019** Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

Charles Jerome Broquard appeals pro se from the district court’s default

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judgment and permanent injunction in plaintiff’s diversity action alleging defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and extortion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the entry of default judgment as a discovery sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37. Stars’ Desert Inn Hotel & Country Club, Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment and a permanent injunction against Broquard because Broquard failed to comply with court-ordered discovery. See Dreith v. Nuy Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the five factors the district court must weigh before entering default as a sanction for discovery misconduct, and noting that “we will overturn a dismissal sanction only if we have a definite and firm conviction that it was clearly outside the acceptable range of sanctions” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

To the extent Broquard argues that his conduct was not willful, Broquard did not show that his failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was due to circumstances beyond his control. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (all that is required to demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault is “disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 17-56772 Broquard’s contentions that the injunction violates his First Amendment rights, the district court violated his due process rights, and the district court was biased and prejudiced against him, are unpersuasive.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff’s motion to file a supplemental brief (Docket Entry No. 26) is granted. The Clerk shall file the supplemental brief at Docket Entry No. 27 and the supplemental excerpts of record at Docket Entry No. 28.

AFFIRMED.

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