NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-50208

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:17-cr-02726-LAB-1 v.

MEMORANDUM* JAIME IVAN MENDEZ-MACIEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 18, 2019** Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Jaime Ivan Mendez-Maciel appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 151-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). we affirm.

Mendez-Maciel challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a second continuance of the sentencing hearing. Contrary to Mendez-Maciel’s contention, remand is required only where prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance is established. See United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 543 (9th Cir. 2011). Because Mendez-Maciel has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the denial of a second continuance, he has not shown that the district court abused its discretion or violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See id. The record reflects that the district court allowed Mendez-Maciel to present his arguments at the sentencing hearing and it considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Mendez-Maciel has not identified what information he would have provided the court that might have convinced it to impose a lower sentence had he been granted a second continuance. Finally, the significantly below-Guidelines sentence, which comported with the terms of Mendez-Maciel’s plea agreement, is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

2 18-50208