U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2020

Gigi Tokin v. Andrew Saul

Gigi Tokin v. Andrew Saul
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Decided March 6, 2020

Gigi Tokin v. Andrew Saul

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GIGI TOKIN, No. 19-35196 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01796-RSM v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 4, 2020** Seattle, Washington Before: IKUTA, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.

Gigi Tokin appeals the determination of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”)—which was affirmed by a federal district court–—that she is not entitled to social security benefits because she is not disabled. We have jurisdiction under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court.

Ms. Tokin’s sole challenge on appeal is that the ALJ should have addressed two vocational rehabilitation assessments discussing, among other things, Ms. Tokin’s inability to concentrate and follow instructions while working. But any error by the ALJ in not addressing these assessments was harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). Indeed, the ALJ gave little weight to a very similar vocational rehabilitation assessment in part because it was inconsistent with the medical evidence and Ms. Tokin’s daily activities. And those same reasons—which are supported by substantial evidence and are uncontested on appeal—apply equally to the two assessments the ALJ did not consider. This means that any error by the ALJ in not addressing the assessments was harmless— that is, “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” and unable to “alter[] the outcome of the case.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.