Dorothy Maraglino v. J. Espinosa
Dorothy Maraglino v. J. Espinosa
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
MAR 6 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DOROTHY GRACE MARIE No. 19-16189 MARAGLINO,
D.C. No. 1:17-cv-01535-LJO-BAM
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* J. ESPINOSA, Warden; C. COOPER, Associate Warden,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 3, 2020** Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dorothy Grace Marie Maraglino appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations in connection with restitution payments. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Maraglino’s due process claim arising from the withholding of restitution and fees from deposits to her inmate trust account because Maraglino had an adequate postdeprivation remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”).
The district court properly dismissed Maraglino’s due process claim arising from the treatment of her prison appeals because Maraglino “lack[s] a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Maraglino’s state law claims because the court
2 19-16189 dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 897, 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-16189
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished