Felipe Galvan, Jr. v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank
Felipe Galvan, Jr. v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 9 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FELIPE HALILI GALVAN, Jr., No. 18-16958
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01823-TLN-EFB v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; U.S. MEMORANDUM* BANK, N.A., as Trustee for WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR17,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 10, 2020** San Francisco, California
Before: RAWLINSON and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,*** District Judge
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. Appellant Felipe Halili Galvan, Jr. (Galvan) alleged that Appellee JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) wrongfully foreclosed on his residential property after
rejecting a loan modification in bad faith. Galvan contends that the district court
erroneously dismissed his complaint based on the statutes of limitations applicable
to his claims for wrongful foreclosure, negligence, unjust enrichment, and
violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Galvan further asserts that the
district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend his complaint.
The district court properly dismissed Galvan’s claims as barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations.1 Galvan was not entitled to tolling of the statutes
of limitations under California’s discovery rule because he delayed filing his
complaint until 2017, although his claims accrued in 2010, when Chase allegedly
rejected the loan modification and wrongfully foreclosed on Galvan’s property.
See MGA Entm’t, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 5th 554, 561 (2019) (explaining
that “the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to suspect
an injury and some wrongful cause”) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation
1 None of the applicable limitation periods for Galvan’s claims exceeded four years. See (1) Cal. Code Civ. P. § 338(a) & (d) (three-year statute of limitations for “liability created by statute” and fraud claims); (2) Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for negligence); (3) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (four-year statute of limitations for violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). 2 marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend as
futile because Galvan’s claims were time-barred. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v.
EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished