NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 23 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROBIN LUCAS; et al., No. 19-15176 Plaintiffs-Appellees, D.C. No. 3:96-cv-02905-TEH v. MEMORANDUM* O. IVAN WHITE; et al., Defendants-Appellees, v. RHONDA FLEMING, Proposed Intervenor, Movant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 14, 2020*** Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Rhonda Fleming appeals pro se from the district court’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). order denying her motion to intervene and to enforce the settlement agreement in Lucas v. White, 96-cv-02905 (N.D. Cal.). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Fleming’s motion because it had previously dismissed the action with prejudice and did not expressly retain jurisdiction or incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement in its order. See Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (“If a district court wishes to retain jurisdiction to later enforce the terms of a settlement agreement, the order dismissing a case with prejudice must incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement or expressly retain jurisdiction.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fleming’s motion for default. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that the district court may deny a motion for default where the claims of the party seeking default lack merit).

We reject as without merit Fleming’s contention that the district court denied her due process.

2 19-15176 We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 19-15176