Rigoberto Mejia-Chay v. Merrick Garland

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Rigoberto Mejia-Chay v. Merrick Garland

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 24 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RIGOBERTO MEJIA-CHAY, No. 20-70390

Petitioner, Agency No. A208-573-243 v.

MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 15, 2022** Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Rigoberto Mejia-Chay, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies as to whether Mejia-Chay spoke to his attackers when robbed, the reason Mejia-Chay entered the United States and whether he fears future harm, and the number of employees at his business, and based on a lack of corroborating evidence. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d. at 1048 (adverse credibility determination reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”). Mejia-Chay’s explanations do not compel a contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Mejia- Chay did not present corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish his eligibility for relief. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (applicant’s documentary evidence was insufficient to independently support claim). Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Mejia-Chay’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Substantial evidence supports the denial of Mejia-Chay’s CAT claim because it was based on the same evidence found not credible, and he does not

2 20-70390 point to any other record evidence that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.

Mejia-Chay does not raise, and therefore waives, any challenge to the BIA’s determination that the record does not support his claim that the IJ showed a pattern of prejudice. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party's opening brief are waived).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 20-70390

Reference

Status
Unpublished