NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 22 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRITTANY ANN STILLWELL, No. 22-55312

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.

2:21-cv-07040-GW-MAR v. FASHION NOVA, LLC, a California MEMORANDUM* Limited Liability Company; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees, and DANIEL R. MARKEL, an individual; DOES, 1 through 10,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 22, 2023**

San Francisco, California

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Brittany Stillwell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing and striking claims that arose out of a commercial relationship between her company The Compliance Firm (TCF) and Appellee Fashion Nova Logistics (FNL) pursuant to which TCF was to provide COVID-19 testing to FNL employees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not err in granting in part both of FNL’s anti-SLAPP motions against the original and amended complaints. We review the district court’s grant of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo where, as here, the movant challenged the legal sufficiency of the pleading and the district court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2018). In both of the anti-SLAPP motions, FNL met its initial burden to show that the stricken allegations and claims attacked allegations it made and positions it took in earlier-filed litigation, quintessential acts in furtherance of FNL’s right to petition the courts. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e). Stillwell could not carry her burden to show a probability of prevailing on her claims because she could not overcome the California litigation privilege, which similarly protects allegations and claims made in court submissions. See Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 741 (9th Cir. 2014). Because FNL made a challenge to the legal sufficiency of Stillwell’s complaints,

2 Stillwell was not entitled to conduct discovery before the court ruled on the motions. See Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 833.

We review a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The district court did not err in dismissing Stillwell’s three claims for forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 1 Stillwell did not state a claim under § 1589(a)(2). Stillwell did not allege that FNL obtained labor from her “by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm” because a reasonable person with her background and in her circumstances would not have felt compelled to perform labor for FNL. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2); see also United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, Stillwell did not state a claim under § 1589(a)(3) because FNL, in filing its own action because of TCF’s alleged breaches of contract and fraud, did not use the legal process in a “manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed.” Id. § 1589(c)(1). Because Stillwell did not plausibly allege FNL used an unlawful method of obtaining her labor, she did not plausibly allege a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) for benefitting from participating in a venture that obtained labor 1 Stillwell argues that the district court struck these claims under the anti-SLAPP statute because she did not show a probability of prevailing. But the district court actually dismissed them under Rule 12(b)(6). Because Stillwell is a pro se litigant and because the same legal framework applies to both arguments in this case, we will construe her argument as one against the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. See Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.”) (cleaned up).

3 through unlawful means.

The district court did not err in dismissing Stillwell’s claim under the California Trafficking Victims’ Protection Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.5. Stillwell did not allege that FNL obtained her labor through “substantial and sustained restriction of [her] liberty” through “confinement or restraint.” People v. Oliver, 54 Cal. App. 5th 1084, 1096 (2020), citing Cal. Pen. Code § 236.1(h)(5).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second opportunity to amend. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court had previously given Stillwell leave to amend most of her claims and provided her with guidance on those claims’ deficiencies; it was not required to give her further leave to amend. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). Stillwell identified no new material facts or points of law that the district court overlooked in its orders. See 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.2 2 The request for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED.

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