FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA                  No. 21-15751
OF ME-WUK INDIANS;
CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE;                    D.C. No.
BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA;                     1:19-cv-00024-
HOPLAND BAND OF POMO                       AWI-SKO
INDIANS; ROBINSON
RANCHERIA,
           Plaintiffs-Appellees,           OPINION

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; GAVIN
NEWSOM, Governor of California,
           Defendants-Appellants.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Eastern District of California
      Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted February 16, 2023
               San Francisco, California
                 Filed April 25, 2023
  Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Daniel A. Bress, and
          Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
                Opinion by Judge Bress
2       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


                          SUMMARY *


                         Attorneys’ Fees

    The panel denied a request for attorneys’ fees by Indian
Tribes that prevailed in their lawsuit against the State of
California under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
     The Tribes sued the State of California for its failure to
comply with IGRA. In an earlier opinion (Chicken Ranch
I), the panel ruled for the Tribes, first noting that California
Government Code § 98005 explicitly waived the state’s
sovereign immunity from suit. The panel held that
California violated IGRA by failing to negotiate in good
faith a Class III gaming compact with the Tribes, and it
ordered the district court to implement IGRA’s remedial
framework.
     After prevailing, the Tribes sought attorneys’ fees spent
litigating the Chicken Ranch I appeal. Because IGRA does
not authorize fee shifting, the Tribes sought attorneys’ fees
under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, which
allows an award of fees to a prevailing party “in any action
which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest,” if certain other conditions are
met.
    California argued that, although it consented to the
Tribes’ underlying IGRA action, it did not submit to federal
court adjudication of an attendant attorneys’ fee motion
because attorneys’ fees are not available through an IGRA

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA       3


action. The panel concluded that this contention merely
collapsed California’s sovereign immunity defense into its
merits argument that IGRA’s lack of a fee-shifting provision
was dispositive.
    The panel held that, because the Tribes prevailed on a
federal cause of action, they were entitled to attorneys’ fees
only if federal law allowed them. Because it did not, the
panel denied the Tribes’ fee request. The panel rejected the
Tribes’ argument that there is an exception authorizing
attorneys’ fees in federal question cases when the claims
implicate “substantial and significant issues of state
law.” The panel distinguished Independent Living Center of
Southern California, Inc. v. Kent, 

 (9th Cir.
2018), in which there was no federal cause of action but there
was federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that
fell within a small category cases where a federal issue is
necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and
capable of resolution in federal court without disturbing the
federal-state balance approved by Congress.



                        COUNSEL

Timothy M. Muscat (argued), Deputy Attorney General;
Aimee Feinberg, Deputy Solicitor General; William P.
Torngren, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Sara J.
Drake, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta,
Attorney General of California; Office of the California
Attorney General; Sacramento, California; Noel Fischer,
Deputy Attorney General; Office of the California Attorney
General; San Diego, California; for Defendants-Appellants.
4      CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


Lester J. Marston (argued), Rapport and Marston, Ukiah,
California; David B. Dehnert, Dehnert Law PC, Marina Del
Rey, California; Kostan R. Lathouris, Lathouris Law PLLC,
Henderson, Nevada; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Kristin L. Martin, McCracken Stemerman & Holsberry LLP,
Oakland, California, for Amicus Curiae Unite Here
International Union.
George Forman, Jay B. Shapiro, and Margaret C. Rosenfeld,
Forman Shapiro & Rosenfeld, Nicasio, California, for Amici
Curiae Bear River Band of Rohnerville Rancheria, Cahuilla
Band of Indians, Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the
Colusa Indian Community, and the Soboba Band of Luisen� o
Indians.
Laura E. Hirahara, California State Association of Counties,
Sacramento, California, for Amicus Curiae California State
Association of Counties.

OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

    We decide an issue of attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff
Indian Tribes prevailed in their lawsuit against the State of
California under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA), 

 et seq. But because IGRA does
not authorize fee shifting, the Tribes ask for attorneys’ fees
under California law. We hold that because the plaintiffs
prevailed on a federal cause of action, they are entitled to
attorneys’ fees only if federal law allows them. Because it
does not, we deny the Tribes’ fee request.
       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA       5


                              I
    The plaintiff Tribes—Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-
Wuk Indians, Blue Lake Rancheria, Chemehuevi Indian
Tribe, Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, and Robinson
Rancheria—sued the State of California for its failure to
comply with IGRA. In Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-
Wuk Indians v. California, 

 (9th Cir. 2022)
(Chicken Ranch I), we ruled for the Tribes.
     We considered in Chicken Ranch I whether California
violated IGRA by failing to negotiate in good faith a Class
III gaming compact with the Tribes. See 

(d)(3)(A). Class III gaming—high-stakes Las Vegas-
style casino gambling—is permitted on Indian lands only if,
among other things, a tribe and the state enter a tribal-state
compact. Chicken Ranch I, 

. In Chicken
Ranch I, we first noted that California Government Code
§ 98005 explicitly waived the state’s sovereign immunity
from suit. Id. at 1032 n.1. We then held that, under IGRA,
California had failed to engage in good faith negotiations
with the Tribes because California had insisted that the
Tribes agree to compact provisions relating to family law,
environmental regulation, and tort law that were far outside
of IGRA’s permissible topics of negotiation. Id. at 1029
(citing 

(d)(3)(C)).
    Because California had not negotiated in good faith, we
ordered the district court to implement IGRA’s remedial
framework, which is “designed to force the state to the
bargaining table and get the deal done.” 

. Chicken
Ranch I contains extensive discussion of the intricacies of
IGRA’s compact negotiation framework and how California
had violated it. But what matters here is that the Tribes sued
under IGRA and won.
6      CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


    After prevailing, the Tribes filed a motion in this court
seeking over $1 million in attorneys’ fees spent litigating the
Chicken Ranch I appeal. The Tribes argue that we should
order fees under California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1021.5, which allows an award of fees to a prevailing party
“in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest,” if certain other
conditions are met. We thus consider whether the Tribes are
entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees. See 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6;
Orn v. Astrue, 

, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
                               II
                               A
    California first argues that sovereign immunity bars the
Tribes’ request for a fee award. See Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 

 (1996). States generally enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit, but a state “may choose to
waive its immunity in federal court at its pleasure.”
Sossamon v. Texas, 

 (2011). “A State’s
consent to suit must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in the text
of the relevant statute.” 

 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 

 (1984)). It “may not
be implied.” 

 And when a court does find waiver, it is to
be “strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the
sovereign.” 

 at 285 (quoting Lane v. Peña, 

 (1996)).
    Even against this demanding standard, we already
recognized that California consented to suit in this case. As
we noted in our earlier opinion, through California
Government Code § 98005, “California has expressly
consented to federal suits brought by California tribes under
IGRA.” Chicken Ranch I, 

 n.1 (citing In re
       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA        7


Indian Gaming Related Cases (Coyote Valley II), 

, 1101 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2003)). California explicitly
consented “to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States in any action brought against the state by any federally
recognized California Indian tribe asserting any cause of
action arising from the state’s refusal to enter into
negotiations . . . pursuant to IGRA or to conduct those
negotiations in good faith.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 98005.
    California responds that, although it consented to the
Tribes’ underlying IGRA action, it did not submit to federal
court adjudication of an attendant attorneys’ fee motion.
California does not suggest that, had IGRA contained a fee-
shifting provision, the waiver of sovereign immunity in
§ 98005 would not encompass such relief.            Instead,
California maintains that attorneys’ fees are just not
available through an IGRA action. That contention,
however, merely collapses California’s sovereign immunity
defense into its merits argument that IGRA’s lack of a fee-
shifting provision is dispositive. Cf. Mashiri v. Dep’t of
Educ., 

 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(addressing analogous situation in which sovereign
immunity “merged with the question on the merits”)
(quotations and alterations omitted). The key question, to
which we now turn, is whether the Tribes may obtain
attorneys’ fees in this IGRA case.
                              B
   We have long held that “[i]n a pure federal question case
brought in federal court, federal law governs attorney fees.”
Disability Law Ctr. of Alaska, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist.,

 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Bass v. First Pac.
Networks, Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2000)). And
under federal law, which follows the so-called “American
8      CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


Rule,” “absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay
their own attorneys’ fees.” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc’y, 

 (1975); see also
Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., 

, 370–71 (2019);
Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 

, 126
(2015). IGRA is, of course, a federal statute. In Chicken
Ranch I, our jurisdiction was thus based on a federal
question. 

(d)(7)(A)(i); 

.
And IGRA contains no provision for attorneys’ fees.
    We have held, to be sure, that “[a] federal court sitting in
diversity applies the law of the forum state regarding an
award of attorneys’ fees.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of
Bishop, 

, 883 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alaska
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[S]tate law on attorney’s fees is
substantive, so state law applies in diversity cases.”). That
result flows from basic Erie principles. See, e.g., Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co., 

 n.31; Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. Cal., Inc. v. Kent, 

 (9th Cir. 2018).
State law governing attorneys’ fees can also apply to state
law claims over which federal courts exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See MRO Commc’ns, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 

 (9th Cir. 1999); Cotton v. Slone, 

, 180–81 (2d Cir. 1993).
    But in Chicken Ranch I, we were not sitting in diversity
jurisdiction. Indeed, there was no state law claim in the case
at all. Resolution of the Tribes’ request for attorneys’ fees
should thus be open and shut: this was a purely federal
question case, and the Tribes point to no provision of IGRA
or any other federal law authorizing attorneys’ fees in an
IGRA action. Congress did not opt out of the default
American Rule, and so the Tribes’ fee motion fails.
       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA          9


    The Tribes creatively argue otherwise.                 They
acknowledge the established law that we have just set forth.
But they maintain there is an exception authorizing
attorneys’ fees in federal question cases when the claims
implicate, in the Tribes’ words, “substantial and significant
issues of state law.” Even though the Tribes did not allege a
violation of state law in their complaint, they assert that state
law was implicated in Chicken Ranch I. The Tribes point
out, for instance, that state law in a sense enabled this
controversy, because it was state law that allowed
California’s Governor to engage in tribal-state compact
negotiations, see Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(f); Cal. Gov’t
Code § 12012.25(d), and state law that waived California’s
sovereign immunity in IGRA actions, Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 98005. The Tribes further argue that California’s violation
of IGRA’s good-faith negotiation duty “necessarily” led
California to violate state law as well, because the state’s
authority to negotiate in this area is premised on its
compliance with IGRA.
    The Tribes thus claim that this is the “highly unusual”
case in which state law should govern a request for
attorneys’ fees in a federal question case because state law
was supposedly “central and essential” to our disposition of
the underlying appeal. The Tribes assert, in particular, that
our decision in Independent Living Center of Southern
California, Inc. v. Kent, 

 (9th Cir. 2018),
supports this approach for a fee award. As we now explain,
it does not.
    Kent took a long and winding procedural course, and we
will limit ourselves to recounting only the most pertinent
details. See 

 (describing a “decade-long journey
within the federal court system”). The federal Medicaid Act
“authorizes the federal government to distribute funds to
10     CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


states for the purpose of providing medical assistance to low-
income persons,” and it requires that states set sufficient
provider reimbursement rates so that medical care will be
available to the general population. 

. The
California legislature enacted a statute reducing
reimbursement rates by ten percent. 

 A group of health
care providers then petitioned for a writ of mandamus in
state court under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085,
a state law writ mechanism, arguing that the reimbursement
reduction conflicted with the federal Medicaid Act and was
preempted under the Supremacy Clause. Id.
    The defendants, the California Department of Health
Care Services and its director, removed the action to federal
court based on federal question jurisdiction. Id. Initially,
federal question jurisdiction was ostensibly premised on the
theory that the plaintiffs’ “cause of action . . . constitute[d] a
suit pursuant to the Supremacy Clause to enjoin state
legislation allegedly preempted by a federal statute (here, the
Medicaid Act).” Id. at 278; see also Indep. Living Ctr. of S.
Cal. v. Shewry, 

, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2008);
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 

, 1048–
49 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari in the case to decide whether the plaintiffs
could sue under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the
Medicaid law. But the Court ended up not reaching the issue
and remanded for our further consideration. See Douglas v.
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 

 (2012).
Following Douglas, the parties settled. The plaintiffs then
moved for attorneys’ fees under California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1021.5, the same provision the Tribes invoke
here.
   Our decision in Kent addressed the attorneys’ fees issue.
By that time, however, the Supreme Court had held in
       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA        11


Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, Inc., 

 (2015), that “the Supremacy Clause is not the source of
any federal rights” and “certainly does not create a cause of
action.” 

 at 324–25 (quotations omitted). In Kent, we
nonetheless clarified that although there was no federal
cause of action in the case, there was still federal question
jurisdiction because the case fell within the “special and
small category of cases,” Gunn v. Minton, 

(2013) (quotations omitted), in which “[f]ederal jurisdiction
over state-law claims will lie if a federal issue is ‘(1)
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and
(4) capable of resolution in federal court without disturbing
the federal-state balance approved by Congress.’” Kent, 

 (quoting Gunn, 

).
    Even though we had federal question jurisdiction, we
were clear that whether California law governed the request
for attorneys’ fees depended on whether the plaintiffs had
brought a state or federal law claim. As we stated: “The
central question in this appeal is whether Appellants brought
a state-law claim or a federal claim, for the answer to that
question will determine whether they are entitled to seek
attorneys’ fees pursuant to California’s § 1021.5 in federal
court.” Id. at 278. We then held that because “Appellants
brought a state-law claim, . . . they are therefore permitted to
seek fees pursuant to § 1021.5.” Id.
    Kent did not suggest that the prevalence of a state law
backdrop could somehow justify applying a state law
attorneys’ fees provision to a purely federal claim. It did not
create some kind of “exception” to the usual rules, as the
Tribes maintain. Kent itself reiterated that “in a ‘pure federal
question case’ in federal court, federal law governs
attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 281 (quoting Disability Law Ctr., 

). Kent was an unusual case because we had
12     CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


federal question jurisdiction but no federal cause of action.
See id. at 279. But at bottom, Kent was simply an application
(on somewhat knotty facts) of the usual rule that state law
governing attorneys’ fees generally applies to state law
claims.
    For that reason, the thrust of our analysis in Kent was in
service of proving up that the plaintiffs in that case had, in
fact, pursued an actionable state law claim—a point of some
complexity in the case. We explained that following
Armstrong, in which the Supreme Court had rejected an
implied cause of action under the Supremacy Clause,
“Appellants’ cause of action must be grounded in state law,
if a cause of action is to exist under the circumstances
alleged.” Id. at 280; see also id. at 281 (“[A]s Armstrong
elucidated, there was simply no federal right of action to be
had.”). We then concluded, based on an extensive review of
how California writ actions could be employed, that the
plaintiffs’ California writ action that precipitated the case
“endured as a state-law claim.” Id. at 280. Because the
plaintiffs had prevailed on “a state-law cause of action, we
look[ed] to California law to determine whether attorneys’
fees [were] available.” Id. at 283. Under Kent’s claim-based
framework, California law does not apply to the Tribes’
request for attorneys’ fees because the Tribes brought and
prevailed on a federal claim only.
     The Tribes flag that in Kent, we at one point noted that
“a significant portion of Appellants’ success was due to our
interpretation of state law.” Id. at 281. From this, the Tribes
would have us apply state law on attorneys’ fees even when
there is only a federal claim in the case, if, as the Tribes put
it, there is a sufficient “entanglement between the state and
federal law issues that arose in the litigation.” As a
descriptive matter, the Tribes’ comparison to Kent is inapt
       CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA        13


because the Tribes’ success in Chicken Ranch I was based
predominately on our interpretation of federal, not state law.
But more importantly, the Tribes again misunderstand Kent.
    Consistent with the rest of our analysis in the case, the
passage in Kent on which the Tribes rely was merely part of
our explanation for why the Kent plaintiffs’ suit was
properly characterized as advancing a state law claim. We
did not suggest that, in deciding which law applies to an
attorneys’ fees motion in a purely federal question case, we
should conduct an indeterminate analysis into how much
state law was at play in the litigation. That would conflict
with Kent’s core premise that whether state law applies to an
attorneys’ fees motion turns on whether the plaintiffs
“brought a state-law claim or a federal claim.” Id. at 278.
The Tribes’ preferred approach would also be quite difficult
to administer, especially in cases brought against state
actors, in which state law issues will inevitably be part of the
story.
    The upshot of Kent is that, in determining whether state
law applies to an attorneys’ fees motion, the presence of
federal law issues in the litigation does not somehow
transform a state law claim into a federal one. Likewise here,
the Tribes’ IGRA claim did not lose its character as a federal
claim simply because state law issues were lurking in the
case or because state law in some sense set the stage for the
violation of federal law that was the basis of the action. It is
the nature of the claim on which a party prevails, Kent makes
clear, that “will determine” whether state or federal law
applies to any ensuing request for attorneys’ fees. Id.
    Our decision in Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 

 (9th Cir. 2016), only reinforces our conclusion. The
plaintiff in that case alleged that a city noise ordinance
14     CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA


violated both California law and the federal Constitution. 

at 696–97.       The plaintiff prevailed on his federal
constitutional claim, did not prevail on his state law claims,
and then, as relevant here, sought attorneys’ fees under
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. Id. at 698, 701.
    We held that California law did not apply to the fee
motion. Because the plaintiff “was only a prevailing party
on his federal claims,” we said that federal law, “and not
state law, is the relevant authority.” Id. at 702 (quoting
Modzelewski v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 

, 1379 (9th
Cir. 1994)) (alteration omitted). Klein, like Kent, confirms
that it is the nature of the claim on which a party prevailed
(federal or state) that determines the law that applies (federal
or state) to any request for attorneys’ fees.
    Because the Tribes brought a claim only under IGRA,
California law does not govern their request for fees. And
because federal law does not provide for fee shifting here,
the Tribes’ motion for attorneys’ fees must be
     DENIED.