NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED APR 25 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SANTIAGO VAZQUEZ, No. 21-35759 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-01761-HZ v. MEMORANDUM* MARTHA LEE WALTERS, Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court; THOMAS A.

BALMER; CHRISTOPHER L. GARRETT; ROGER J. DEHOOG, Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court; MEAGAN A. FLYNN; REBECCA DUNCAN; ADRIENNE NELSON, Associate Justices of the Oregon Supreme Court, each sued in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 17, 2023** Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Santiago Vazquez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an equal protection violation in connection with the temporary rules governing admission to the Oregon bar in 2020. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Vazquez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the classification scheme in question was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See United States v. Padilla-Diaz, 862 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining rational bases review and recognizing that the challenger of a classification bears the burden of “negativing every conceivable basis which might support it” (citation omitted and alteration adopted)); see also Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “classifications that are to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive” may be upheld under rational-basis review (citation omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vazquez’s motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint because Vazquez’s proposed complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim. See Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053-58 (9th Cir. 2019) (setting forth elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim and explaining that

2 21-35759 a plaintiff must plausibly allege that retaliation was the but-for motive for defendants’ actions); see also id. at 1055 (recognizing that an allegation is not plausible where there is an “obvious alternative explanation” for alleged misconduct (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009)); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of review).

Defendants’ motion to substitute party (Docket Entry No. 26) is granted.

AFFIRMED.

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