FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESUS FIGUEROA OCHOA,                          No. 20-72510

                    Petitioner,                 Agency No.
                                               A092-693-089
    v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                     OPINION
General,

                    Respondent.

          On Petition for Review of an Order of the
              Board of Immigration Appeals

           Argued and Submitted October 4, 2022
                     Portland, Oregon

                      Filed June 20, 2023

Before: John B. Owens and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges,
           and David A. Ezra,* District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Miller


*
 The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
2                  FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND


                          SUMMARY**


                           Immigration

    Dismissing Jesus Figueroa Ochoa’s petition for review
of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that
upheld the denial of a continuance and denied a motion to
remand, the panel concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction. Figueroa Ochoa had sought cancellation of
removal and adjustment of status. An immigration judge
denied relief because of Figueroa Ochoa’s criminal record,
and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Figueroa
Ochoa’s challenge hinged on his contention that the agency
erred factually in attributing a criminal conviction to him,
arguing that it truly belonged to his brother.
    The panel concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review that
claim because—with an exception not at issue here—
Congress forbade judicial review of “any judgment
regarding the granting of relief under” the provisions
governing cancellation and adjustment. 

(a)(2)(B)(i). The panel was guided by Patel v.
Garland, 

 (2022), in which the Supreme
Court held that the jurisdiction-stripping language in
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “encompasses any and all decisions
relating to the granting or denying of discretionary relief.”
The panel explained that this jurisdictional bar applied even
though Figueroa Ochoa sought review of the denial of a
continuance and a motion to remand, rather than review of
the denial of the underlying relief. The panel noted that its

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND                    3


interpretation accords with that of the Fifth Circuit, while the
Eighth and First Circuits have adopted a narrower view of
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
    Finally, the panel noted that, under Fernandez v.
Gonzales, 

 (9th Cir. 2006), a court may review
the denial of a motion to reopen proceedings for cancellation
in certain circumstances, including if the new evidence
submitted addresses a hardship ground so distinct from that
considered previously as to make the motion a request for
new relief. The panel concluded that it need not decide
whether that holding survives Patel, explaining that, even on
its own terms, Fernandez does not help Figueroa Ochoa
because he did not present a request for new relief within the
meaning of Fernandez.



                         COUNSEL

Carlos A. Cruz (argued), Law Offices of Carlos A. Cruz,
Alhambra, California, for Petitioner.
Jenny C. Lee (argued), Trial Attorney; Anthony P. Nicastro,
Assistant Director; Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department of Justice;
Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
4                FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND

OPINION

MILLER, Circuit Judge:

    Jesus Figueroa Ochoa petitions for review of a final
order of removal of the Board of Immigration Appeals. After
Figueroa Ochoa applied for cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status, the Board upheld an immigration
judge’s denial of those applications and a request for a
continuance, and it denied a motion to remand. In this court,
Figueroa Ochoa challenges the denial of the continuance and
the motion to remand. Applying 

(a)(2)(B)(i)
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Patel v. Garland, 

 (2022), we conclude that those denials involved
judgments by the agency that we lack jurisdiction to review.
We dismiss the petition.
    Figueroa Ochoa is a native and citizen of Mexico. In
2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated
removal proceedings against him, alleging that he had
entered the United States without inspection at a time and
place unknown to the government. Figueroa Ochoa
conceded that he was removable but applied for cancellation
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) and adjustment of
status under 

.
    To be eligible for either of those forms of relief, an
applicant must establish that he has not been convicted of
certain criminal offenses, including any state or federal
offense “relating to a controlled substance.” 

(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); see 

 §§ 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1255(a).
As relevant here, the government alleged that Figueroa
Ochoa had been convicted of three such offenses, all of them
in California state court. First, in 1996, Figueroa Ochoa was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance, in
                 FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND                   5


violation of California Health & Safety Code section
11350(A). Second, in 1999, he was convicted of being under
the influence of a controlled substance, in violation of
California Health & Safety Code section 11550(A). Third,
in 2000, he was again convicted of possession of a controlled
substance.
    At a hearing before an immigration judge, Figueroa
Ochoa explained that he had recently asked a state court to
vacate his 2000 conviction under a provision of state law that
allows a conviction to be vacated if a prejudicial error
impaired the defendant’s “ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual
or potential adverse immigration consequences of a”
conviction. 

(a)(1) (2017) (amended
2022). He requested a continuance so that the state court
could rule on his motion before the immigration judge
considered his application.
    The immigration judge denied a continuance. The
immigration judge expressed skepticism about the prospects
for vacatur of the 2000 conviction but also reasoned that
vacatur would not make any difference to Figueroa Ochoa’s
eligibility for cancellation of removal and adjustment of
status because the 1996 and 1999 convictions would be
independent barriers to his eligibility. Figueroa Ochoa
argued that neither the 1996 nor the 1999 conviction should
count as disqualifying offenses. As to the 1996 conviction,
he said that he was granted a diversion by the state court, and
that after he successfully completed the diversion program,
his conviction was “dismissed.” As to the 1999 conviction,
he argued that it was included in his criminal history report
by mistake and that it was actually a conviction of his
brother, not him. The immigration judge rejected both
arguments. Of particular relevance here, the immigration
6                FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND


judge examined the record of the 1999 conviction and
concluded that it did, in fact, involve Figueroa Ochoa and
not his brother.
    Despite the immigration judge’s skepticism, the state
court did vacate Figueroa Ochoa’s 2000 conviction. When
Figueroa Ochoa appealed the immigration judge’s decision
to the Board of Immigration Appeals, he renewed his
argument that the immigration judge should have granted a
continuance, and he asked the Board to remand his case so
that the immigration judge could evaluate the effect of the
state court’s decision on his applications.
      The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of
the continuance and denied Figueroa Ochoa’s motion to
remand. In its discussion of Figueroa Ochoa’s convictions,
the Board did not mention the 2000 conviction, but it twice
referred to Figueroa Ochoa’s efforts to vacate the “1996
conviction.” The government suggests, and we agree, that
the context makes clear that the Board meant to discuss the
2000 conviction—the only conviction for which Figueroa
Ochoa had sought vacatur—and that its references to the
1996 conviction were a scrivener’s error. But despite the
vacatur of the 2000 conviction, the Board said that it was
“not persuaded that a remand would change the outcome in
the case” because Figueroa Ochoa’s “1999 drug conviction
. . . would also serve as a bar to cancellation of removal.”
     Figueroa Ochoa petitioned for review, challenging the
immigration judge’s denial of the request for a continuance
and the Board’s denial of the motion to remand. His
challenge hinges on his contention that the agency erred in
attributing the 1999 conviction to him. If the 1999 conviction
truly belonged to Figueroa Ochoa’s brother rather than to
Figueroa Ochoa, then the vacatur of the 2000 conviction
                 FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND                    7


might have made him eligible for relief, thus warranting
either a continuance before the state court ruled or a remand
to the immigration judge after the state court ruled.
    Before we proceed to consider that issue, we note one
question that is not before us: whether Figueroa Ochoa’s
1996 conviction might also be a barrier to relief. Although
the Board mentioned a “1996 conviction,” it did so only in
its mistaken references to the 2000 conviction. So far as we
can determine from the Board’s opinion—and as the
government appears to agree—the Board did not say
anything about the actual 1996 conviction. Accordingly, we
cannot rely on it in evaluating Figueroa Ochoa’s eligibility
for relief. See Arrey v. Barr, 

 (9th Cir.
2019); cf. Calcutt v. FDIC, 598 U.S. ----, 

,

, at *3 (2023) (per curiam).
    The question before us is therefore whether the Board
erred in determining that Figueroa Ochoa was convicted of
a drug offense in 1999; that, as a result, he is ineligible for
cancellation of removal or adjustment of status; and that he
accordingly was not entitled to a continuance or a remand.
In seeking review of that question, Figueroa Ochoa invokes
our jurisdiction under 

. Although the
government agrees with Figueroa Ochoa that we have
jurisdiction, our jurisdiction is limited to that conferred upon
us by Congress consistent with Article III, and the parties
cannot enlarge it by their agreement. See Negrete v. City of
Oakland, 

, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2022). We therefore
have a duty to assure ourselves of our jurisdiction even when
neither party has challenged it. See WMX Techs., Inc. v.
Miller, 

, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
   We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider
Figueroa Ochoa’s petition for review. Congress has
8                FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND


specified that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . .
any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” various
provisions of the immigration laws, including sections
1229b and 1255, the provisions governing cancellation of
removal and adjustment of status. 

(a)(2)(B)(i). In applying section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Patel,
in which the Court held that the jurisdiction-stripping
provision “encompasses any and all decisions relating to the
granting or denying of discretionary relief,” which “plainly
includes factual findings.” 142 S. Ct. at 1621–22 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We therefore may not review any
factual determinations “relating to” the forms of relief
Figueroa Ochoa sought. 

.
    Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides an exception to the
preclusion of jurisdiction by allowing “review of
constitutional claims or questions of law.” Neither party
invokes that exception here, and with good reason.
Sometimes, assessing a prior conviction may require
answering a question of law, such as “Did the alien’s offense
constitute an aggravated felony?” See, e.g., Alfred v.
Garland, 

 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). But the
question the agency confronted in this case was one of
historical fact: “Who was convicted in 1999—Figueroa
Ochoa or his brother?” That is not a question that can be
answered in a law library; it requires looking at case-specific
records pertaining to Figueroa Ochoa.
   That is just what the immigration judge did here. The
immigration judge observed that (1) the name first provided
in the 1999 case was “Jesse Figueroa Ochoa,” which
matched the name provided for Figueroa Ochoa’s 2000
conviction as well as a later conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon; (2) fingerprints taken in 2010 from “Uriel
                 FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND                    9


Figueroa Ochoa”—the other name given in the 1999 case—
matched Figueroa Ochoa’s fingerprints; (3) Figueroa Ochoa
had the same attorney as the defendant in the 1999 case; and
(4) both Figueroa Ochoa and the defendant in the 1999 case
filed motions for expungement on the same day. In other
words, the immigration judge conducted a factual
assessment involving no legal analysis. The exception in
section 1252(a)(2)(D) therefore does not apply.
    Because we cannot review the agency’s finding that
Figueroa Ochoa was convicted of an offense related to a
controlled substance in 1999, we see no error in the agency’s
denial of the continuance or the motion to remand.
Accepting the 1999 conviction as Figueroa Ochoa’s, the
agency correctly reasoned that no matter what happened
with the 2000 conviction, Figueroa Ochoa would remain
ineligible for relief. See, e.g., Flores-Alonso v. United States
Att’y Gen., 

 (11th Cir. 2022) (per
curiam) (holding that Patel requires a court to take the
agency’s factual findings as true and then look at petitioner’s
brief to see if he “has identified any legal error with respect
to the application of the law to those facts established in the
[Board’s] decision”).
    The parties emphasize that Patel involved direct review
of the Board’s denial of relief—in that case, adjustment of
status—whereas this case involves the review of the
agency’s denial of a request for a continuance and a motion
to remand. According to Figueroa Ochoa, such “procedural”
decisions are not subject to the jurisdictional bar; as the
government puts it, they are merely “adjunct” to the ultimate
decision whether to grant cancellation of removal or
adjustment of status.
10                FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND


    Patel forecloses that argument. As we have explained,
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of “any judgment
regarding the granting of relief under” the specified
provisions. In Patel, the Court noted that the word
“judgment” could be read in three possible ways. First, it
could mean “any authoritative decision.” 

.
Second, it could mean only “a decision that requires the use
of discretion.” 

. Third, as Patel suggested, it could
mean “only the ultimate grant or denial of relief.” 

.
That last interpretation is essentially the one that Figueroa
Ochoa advances here, but the Court in Patel expressly
rejected it. Instead, the Court concluded, the first
interpretation “is the only one that fits § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s
text and context.” Id. at 1622.
     The Court emphasized that the statute “prohibits review
of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” the
enumerated provisions. Patel, 

. It
explained that “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning”
and that the word “regarding” likewise “has a broadening
effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only
its subject but also matters relating to that subject.” 

 (first
quoting Babb v. Wilkie, 

, 1173 n.2 (2020);
then quoting Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling, 

 (2018)). Patel’s narrower reading, the
Court explained, “reads ‘regarding’ out of the statute
entirely.” Id. at 1625.
    That reasoning dictates our decision here. In ruling on
the motion for continuance and the motion to remand, the
agency assessed how the vacatur of the 2000 conviction
would affect Figueroa Ochoa’s eligibility for discretionary
relief. That is why it answered the factual question of
whether Figueroa Ochoa was convicted in 1999 for being
under the influence of a controlled substance. Its answer to
                 FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND                   11


that question was indisputably a “judgment”—that is, an
“authoritative decision.” Patel, 

. And it
was a judgment “regarding the granting of” cancellation of
removal and adjustment of status in at least two senses. First,
it was related to those forms of discretionary relief because
it was made in the course of ruling on procedural motions
that were filed as part of Figueroa Ochoa’s effort to obtain
such relief. Second, it was related to those forms of relief
because making it required the agency to evaluate Figueroa
Ochoa’s eligibility for such relief. The agency’s judgment
about the 1999 conviction was thus a judgment relating to—
that is, “regarding”—the ultimate decision to cancel removal
or adjust status.
      For its part, the government relies on Kucana v. Holder,

 (2010), but its argument parallels one rejected
in Patel. In Kucana, the Court considered a different
jurisdiction-stripping provision, section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),
which states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review
. . . any other decision or action . . . the authority for which
is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security.” The Court in Kucana construed that language to
bar judicial review of only those decisions that are made
discretionary by statute, not those made discretionary by
regulation. 

. Kucana had asked the agency to
reopen proceedings (a decision that is discretionary by
regulation) so that he could submit new evidence
establishing his eligibility for asylum (a non-discretionary
determination). The Court held that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
did not bar review of the agency’s decision on the motion to
reopen. 

.
    In Patel, the government invoked Kucana to argue that
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) similarly removed jurisdiction
12               FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND


“exclusively [for] a decision that requires the use of
discretion.” 

, 1624–25. But the Court
rejected that argument, calling Kucana “inapposite” because
it “neither said nor implied anything about review of
eligibility decisions made in the course of exercising th[e]
statutory discretion” referred to in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),
such as cancellation of removal or adjustment of status. 

. Accordingly, nothing in Kucana supports the
exercise of jurisdiction here.
    Our interpretation of section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) accords
with that of the Fifth Circuit, which has applied Patel to
conclude that a court “lack[s] jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s decision not to remand to the IJ to consider new
evidence” supporting an application for discretionary relief.
Perez v. Garland, 

 (5th Cir. 2023). While
some other courts of appeals have adopted a narrower view
of the jurisdiction-stripping provision, we believe that our
interpretation better comports with the statutory text as
interpreted in Patel. See, e.g., Llanas-Trejo v. Garland, 

, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2022) (relying on Kucana and
holding that Patel is irrelevant in determining whether a
court has jurisdiction over motions to reopen even when
review would be prohibited for the underlying relief);
Moreno v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2022) (“This
court has jurisdiction to review denials of motions to reopen,
even where the petitioner’s ultimate goal before the agency
was to garner some form of discretionary relief as to which
this court’s jurisdiction has been substantially curtailed by
statute.”).
   We note that, before Kucana and Patel, we had held in
Fernandez v. Gonzales that a court may review the denial of
a motion to reopen proceedings for cancellation of removal
in certain circumstances, including if “the evidence
                 FIGUEROA OCHOA V. GARLAND                13


submitted addresses a hardship ground so distinct from that
considered previously as to make the motion . . . a request
for new relief.” 

 (9th Cir. 2006). We need
not decide whether that holding survives Patel because, even
on its own terms, Fernandez does not help Figueroa Ochoa.
Throughout this case, Figueroa Ochoa has sought
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status based on
the same theory: that his qualifying relatives would suffer
extraordinary hardship from his removal. And although he
attempted to submit new evidence with his motion to
remand, that evidence related to his 2000 conviction, not the
1999 conviction that formed the basis for the agency’s
decision and that he now challenges, nor to his underlying
claim of hardship. Thus, in the motions whose denial
Figueroa Ochoa asks us to review, he did not present “a
request for new relief” within the meaning of Fernandez. 

.
    In section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), Congress forbade us to
review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under”
the provisions governing cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status except in reviewing constitutional
claims and legal questions. That statute applies to judgments
made in the course of ruling on procedural motions such as
those at issue here. We therefore lack jurisdiction over
Figueroa Ochoa’s challenge to the Board’s decision.
   PETITION DISMISSED.