NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 24 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CRISTINA VELASQUEZ-RAMOS, No. 22-718

Agency No.

Petitioner, A209-873-771 v.

MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 20, 2023**

Pasadena, California Before: NGUYEN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District Judge.

Cristina Velasquez-Ramos, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the immigration judge’s order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***

The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation. protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022), we deny the petition for review.

1. Velasquez-Ramos challenges the agency’s determination that she failed to meet the nexus requirement for asylum and withholding of removal. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that gang members targeted Velasquez-Ramos and her family because they perceived that they had access to money. Velasquez-Ramos adduced no evidence that the gang members’ economic motive for persecution relates to her proposed particular social group of indigenous rural women with limited education.1 See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Where the record indicates that the persecutor’s actual motivation for threatening a person is to extort money . . . [it] does not compel finding that the persecutor threatened the target because of a protected characteristic . . . .”).

2. Velasquez-Ramos next contends that the agency erred in denying her claim for CAT protection. But substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Velasquez-Ramos is not entitled to CAT relief because she has failed to show that she is more likely than not to suffer torture in Guatemala. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). She adduced no record evidence supporting her 1 We do not reach the question of whether Velasquez-Ramos’s proposed particular social group is cognizable.

2 22-718 claim that police would not protect her upon return to Guatemala. The distance from her hometown to the nearest police station is not dispositive because Velasquez-Ramos could relocate closer to a police station upon her return. See id. § 208.16(c)(3) (providing non-exclusive list of considerations for granting CAT relief, including the possibility of relocation to an area where petitioner is not likely to be tortured).

3. Velasquez-Ramos raises a due process claim in her reply brief. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Autotel v. Nev. Bell Tel. Co., 697 F.3d 846, 852 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).

PETITION DENIED.

3 22-718