FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 26 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRANCE WALKER, ex rel. United No. 22-15291 States, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 3:18-cv-00132-MMD-CLB

v. MEMORANDUM* INTELLI-HEART SERVICES, INC.; DANNY WEISBURG; VANNESSA PARSONS; DANIEL L. GERMAIN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 26, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Terrance Walker appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the judgment in

this action.1 We review for an abuse of discretion,2 and we affirm.

The district court reasonably determined that no extraordinary circumstances

justified reopening the judgment. See Henson, 943 F.3d at 443–44. Even if

Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 499 P.3d 611, 614 (Nev. 2021), worked some change in

Nevada’s anti-SLAPP3 jurisprudence, it was not with respect to “‘an issue

dispositive to the outcome of the case’” at hand. Martinez v. Shinn, 33 F.4th 1254,

1263 (9th Cir. 2022); see Bynoe v. Baca, 966 F.3d 972, 983 (9th Cir. 2020). First,

Spirtos plainly did not disturb Nevada law regarding the gist of the claim. Spirtos,

499 P.3d at 616; see also Abrams v. Sanson, 458 P.3d 1062, 1068–69 (Nev. 2020).

Second, nothing in Spirtos changed the fact that certain of Walker’s allegations

were irrelevant to his claims, particularly in light of the conclusions reached in the

underlying judgment. See Spirtos, 499 P.3d at 616. Third, Spirtos did not change

1 To the extent that Walker attempts to appeal issues not arising from the district court’s disposition of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, we dismiss the appeal. See Harman v. Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1457–58 (9th Cir. 1993). 2 See Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 443 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 3 Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.635–41.670. 2 (and could not have changed) this court’s interpretation or application of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to anti-SLAPP motions in federal court. See

CoreCivic, Inc. v. Candide Grp., LLC, 46 F.4th 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022).

Because Spirtos did not change the law governing the judgment, the district court

did not need to explicitly examine the Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135–40

(9th Cir. 2009), factors in its order denying Walker’s motion. See Mitchell v.

United States, 958 F.3d 775, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Henson, 943 F.3d at

444.

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in stating that it would

“not entertain any further filings in this closed case.” See Ready Transp., Inc. v.

AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010). The order does not prevent

future filings and was a reasonable response to Walker’s copious and burdensome

motion practice, particularly when the matter was closed. See Dietz v. Bouldin,

579 U.S. 40, 45–46, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L. Ed. 2d 161 (2016).

AFFIRMED. All pending motions are DENIED.

3