Sanchez-Suazo v. Garland

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Sanchez-Suazo v. Garland

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 16 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DIASIS YAMILET SANCHEZ- No. 22-1605 SUAZO; LUIS DAVID MUNOZ- Agency Nos. SANCHEZ, A201-676-975 A201-676-976 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 14, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, HURWITZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Diasis Yamilet Sanchez-Suazo, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for

review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision dismissing her appeal from an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). order of an immigration judge denying her applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Sanchez’s son is a

derivative beneficiary of her asylum application. Exercising jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252

, we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Sanchez

established neither past persecution nor a clear probability of future persecution in

Honduras. Sanchez claims that unknown men obtained photographs of her children

in school, once entered Sanchez’s home to threaten her, and repeatedly threatened

her partner because he refused to help them transport drugs. These threats alone,

however, do not compel a finding of past persecution. See Sharma v. Garland,

9 F.4th 1052

, 1060–63 (9th Cir. 2021); Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,

918 F.3d 1025

,

1028–29 (9th Cir. 2019). Nor do they compel a finding of a clear probability of

future persecution, especially because Sanchez’s partner and daughter remained

safely in Honduras for at least six months after Sanchez fled. See Sharma, 9 F.4th

at 1066 (“The ongoing safety of family members in the petitioner’s native country

undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.”).

2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Sanchez’s

proposed social group, “immediate family members of truck drivers in Honduras

who refuse to distribute drugs for the drug trafficking cartels,” lacks social

distinction. Although the country reports and testimony document widespread

2 22-1605 violence in Honduras, they do not suggest that families of truck drivers are

“perceived as distinct” by Honduran society. Diaz-Torres v. Barr,

963 F.3d 976, 980

(9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that

Sanchez failed to establish a clear probability of torture by or with the “acquiescence

of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft,

332 F.3d 1186, 1188

(9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). “Torture is an extreme form of

cruel and inhuman treatment” that rises above persecution.

8 C.F.R. § 208.18

(a)(2).

The threats from gang members do not establish past torture or compel a finding of

a likelihood of future torture. Moreover, the country reports document that the

Honduran government is attempting to curb gang violence, and the record does not

compel the conclusion that it would acquiesce to Sanchez’s torture.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 22-1605

Reference

Status
Unpublished