Singh v. Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 14 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RAGHBIR SINGH, No. 22-589 Agency No. Petitioner, A202-068-776 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 12, 2023** San Francisco, California Before: GOULD, KOH, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Raghbir Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision that dismissed his appeal from a decision by an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum and for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Singh’s applications for relief based on an adverse credibility determination made against Singh. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and deny Singh’s petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). We review the agency’s adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence. Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2022). Under that standard, “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. We conclude the IJ’s adverse credibility determination made against Singh is supported by substantial evidence. First, Singh was inconsistent regarding his role in his party. As the IJ explained, Singh contradicted himself by variously stating: (a) that he did nothing; (b) that he put up posters; and (c) that he passed out food and water at meetings. That Singh only stated he put up posters for his party after being asked how the Badal party members identified him is probative evidence supporting the IJ’s finding. Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[O]missions are probative of credibility to the extent that later disclosures, if credited, would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum application.”). The IJ also relied on several other inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony such as (1) whether Singh himself

Second, this Court gives “special deference” to an IJ’s demeanor findings when the IJ cites to specific instances in the record to support its finding and gives fair notice of instances in which the IJ believes the witness is being nonresponsive.

Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 839 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, the IJ properly cited specific instances in the record to support its finding that Singh was “evasive” and “vague,” noting his inability to directly answer questions asking how he was identified and targeted by the Badal party members. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (a pattern of unresponsiveness can support an adverse credibility finding).

Finally, the record contains other “indications of dishonesty.” Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005). Among various other inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and submitted evidence, we note that Singh’s mother’s letter is particularly probative. The third paragraph of the letter appears to be lifted from Singh’s declaration because it recounts Singh’s first encounter with the Badal party members in the first-person, whereas the rest of the letter refers to Singh in the third person or as her “son.” See Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007–08 (noting that an IJ can find a document to be unpersuasive without making a specific finding that the document is forged).

A reasonable adjudicator could find that this was not a one-off communication error based on the IJ’s demeanor finding and numerous other inconsistencies throughout the record.1 PETITION DENIED.