FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                            No. 23-716
                                                      D.C. No.
               Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                   3:21-cr-00019-
                                                    HDM-CSD-1
    v.

GAIL MANNEY,

OPINION

               Defendant - Appellant.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the District of Nevada
         Howard D. McKibben, District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted May 13, 2024
                       Phoenix, Arizona

                      Filed August 19, 2024

Before: Roopali H. Desai and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges,
         and Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge. *

                    Opinion by Judge de Alba


*
 The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
2                         USA V. MANNEY


                          SUMMARY **


                          Criminal Law

     The panel affirmed Gail Manney’s conviction for
violating 

(a)(6), which makes it a crime for
any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted
acquisition of any firearm knowingly to make any false or
fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact
material to the lawfulness of the sale of such firearm.
    The panel rejected Manney’s argument that § 922(a)(6),
as applied to the facts of her case, violates the Second
Amendment. Because the Second Amendment does not
protect an individual’s false statements, the conduct that
§ 922(a)(6) regulates falls outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s plain text.
     The panel also rejected Manney’s contention that her
false statement was not “material” under § 922(a)(6). This
contention is foreclosed by Abramski v. United States, 

 (2014), which held that a false statement regarding
the actual purchaser of a firearm was “material” under
§ 922(a)(6) even if the actual purchaser could legally possess
a firearm.
    The panel disposed of other claims in a concurrently
filed memorandum disposition.




**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         USA V. MANNEY                            3


                           COUNSEL

Nadia J. Ahmed (argued) and Adam M. Flake, Assistant
United States Attorneys; Robert L. Ellman, Assistant United
States Attorney, Appellate Chief; Jason M. Frierson, United
States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, Las
Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Wendi L. Overmyer (argued) and Aarin E. Kevorkian,
Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Rene L. Valladares,
Federal Public Defender; Federal Public Defender for the
District of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendant-
Appellant.

OPINION

DE ALBA, Circuit Judge:

    Gail Manney challenges her conviction under 

(a)(6) and 924(a)(2). 1 One of Manney’s claims is
that, as applied to the facts of her case, 

(a)(6)
violates the Second Amendment. 2               We affirm her
conviction. 3




1
 

(a)(2) outlines the punishment for a violation of 

(a)(6).
2
 Manney’s other claims are disposed of in a concurrently filed
memorandum disposition.
3
 We vacate part of Manney’s sentence as outlined in the memorandum
disposition.
4                          USA V. MANNEY


          I. Factual and Procedural Background
    

(a)(6) makes it a crime “for any person
in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition
of any firearm . . . knowingly to make any false or fictitious
oral or written statement . . . with respect to any fact material
to the lawfulness of the sale . . . of such firearm.”
    On April 21, 2021, Manney and another individual went
to Hi-Cap Firearms (“Hi-Cap”), a federal firearms licensee
located in Reno, Nevada, to purchase firearms. Manney
bought her first firearm from Hi-Cap earlier that week.
While in the store, Manney was on her cell phone, talking
and taking photographs of various firearms. She eventually
chose seven handguns to purchase. A Hi-Cap employee
provided her with copies of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) Form 4473 for each of
the seven handguns, which she needed to fill out and Hi-Cap
needed to process before Manney could take the handguns.
When Manney signed ATF Form 4473, she certified that she
was the actual purchaser of the firearms.
   After Manney left the shop, the Hi-Cap employee
contacted the ATF on suspicion that Manney was a straw
purchaser. 4 ATF assigned the case to Special Agent Joshua
Caron who then requested Hi-Cap provide the ATF Form
4473 Manney signed and surveillance footage from her
purchase. After reviewing the footage, Agent Caron asked
Hi-Cap to schedule Manney’s pickup time so that he could
conduct an interdiction.



4
 A “straw purchaser” is an individual who purchases a gun on another’s
behalf while falsely claiming that it is for herself. Abramski v. United
States, 

, 171 (2014).
                          USA V. MANNEY                              5


    Manney returned to Hi-Cap on May 6, 2021, and paid for
the firearms. When she left the store with her purchase,
Agent Caron approached her and informed Manney that he
was concerned that she purchased the firearms for someone
else. Manney denied the allegation but eventually agreed to
accompany Agent Caron to the ATF Reno office to discuss
the issue further. While at the office, Manney continued to
deny that she purchased the firearms for someone else. She
even consented to let Agent Caron look through her phone.
    Agent Caron searched the phone and found numerous
incriminating WhatsApp messages between Manney and her
son, Razaaq, discussing the purchase of firearms. 5 Razaaq
is a convicted felon who is prohibited from possessing
firearms. On May 27, 2021, the government indicted
Manney for a violation of 

(a)(6) and
924(a)(2) for making false statements on ATF Form 4473.
She was convicted of the charges after a jury trial.
                       II. Legal Standard
    “We review the constitutionality of a statute as a matter
of law de novo . . . . However, constitutional issues not
originally raised at trial are reviewed for plain error.” United
States v. Chi Mak, 

 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citations omitted). The parties disagree on the appropriate
standard of review. We assume, without deciding, that de


5
  In the messages, Razaaq sent Manney a picture of a firearm, stating
“[o]r any 4 you can get for the money.” They then discussed different
firearms to purchase. Razaaq also sent Manney another picture of a
firearm, after which Manney asked “[s]o you want me to get that if they
have it.” In the messages, Manney and Razaaq referenced a future
meeting between Manney and a friend of Razaaq’s for some sort of
exchange; they also show that Razaaq provided money to Manney.
6                      USA V. MANNEY


novo review applies as Manney’s challenge fails under either
standard.
                      III. Discussion
    The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” The Amendment guarantees an individual the
“right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 

 (2008).
    In New York Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 

 (2022), the Supreme Court articulated the proper
framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges.
“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively
protects that conduct.” 

. “The government must
then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is
consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” 

 “Only then may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
unqualified command.” 

 (quotation marks omitted). The
Court used this framework to strike down New York’s
proper cause requirement, holding that the regulation
burdened conduct the Second Amendment’s plain text
protects. 

. It then concluded that the government
failed to meet its “burden to identify an American tradition
justifying the State’s proper-cause requirement.” 

.
    Most recently, the Supreme Court applied the Bruen
framework in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ----, 

 (2024), and held that “[w]hen a restraining order
contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat
to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual
                        USA V. MANNEY                         7


may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned
from possessing firearms while the order is in effect.” 

. The Court reiterated that “the right to keep and bear
arms is among the fundamental rights necessary to our
system of ordered liberty. Derived from English practice
and codified in the Second Amendment, the right secures for
Americans a means of self-defense.” 

 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court did not
purport to “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of
the full scope of the Second Amendment.” 

 at 1903
(citing Bruen, 

). And of note, it did not
elaborate further on the conduct the Second Amendment’s
plain text covers. See id. at 1929 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“And the unresolved questions hardly end there. Who is
protected by the Second Amendment, from a historical
perspective?      To what conduct does the Second
Amendment’s plain text apply?”).
    It is important to remember that “[l]ike most rights, the
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”
Heller, 

. Justice Kavanaugh emphasized this
point in his concurrence in Bruen: “[T]he Second
Amendment is neither a regulatory straitjacket nor a
regulatory blank check. Properly interpreted, the Second
Amendment allows a variety of gun regulations.” Bruen,

 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). In his Bruen concurrence, Justice
Alito discussed the limited sweep of the Court’s
holding. “Our holding decides nothing about who may
lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be
met to buy a gun.” 

 (Alito, J., concurring); see also

 (“All that we decide in this case is that the Second
Amendment protects the right of law-abiding people to carry
a gun outside the home for self-defense and that the Sullivan
8                      USA V. MANNEY


Law, which makes that virtually impossible for most New
Yorkers, is unconstitutional.” (Alito, J., concurring)). And
in Rahimi, Justice Kavanaugh discussed the ongoing validity
of “traditional exceptions to the right.” See 144 S. Ct. at
1923 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[L]ongstanding . . . laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms are presumptively constitutional.” (quoting
Heller, 554 U.S. 626–27) (quotation marks omitted)). We
keep these words in mind as we review Manney’s claim.
    Manney argues that § 922(a)(6), as applied to the facts
of her case, violates the Second Amendment. To analyze her
claim, we must first determine if the plain text of the Second
Amendment covers Manney’s conduct. Precedent has
taught us that handguns qualify as “arms” under the Second
Amendment. Bruen, 

. Further, Manney is a
member of “the people” the Second Amendment protects.
The question then becomes what conduct does § 922(a)(6)
regulate? Manney first argues that § 922(a)(6) regulates a
purchaser’s possessory interest by imposing information
requirements for future transferees. Then, she frames the
conduct more broadly by arguing that the statute inhibited
her ability to acquire arms by regulating the purchase of
firearms. Neither argument is persuasive.
    Although the Supreme Court has yet to expound on all
conduct the Second Amendment’s plain text covers, it has
not held that an individual can invoke the Second
Amendment’s constitutional protection by describing the
conduct in question at such a high level of generality. Nor
has the Court held that every requirement making it slightly
more difficult to possess a firearm demands a full historical
inquiry into its origin. Both Bruen and Rahimi dealt with
prohibitions, or near prohibitions, on the ability to possess
firearms. 597 U.S. at 11–13; 144 S. Ct. 1895–97. By
                       USA V. MANNEY                         9


prohibiting individuals from possessing firearms outside of
the home absent some special need (Bruen) or when subject
to a restraining order (Rahimi), the statutory provisions in
each case directly implicated the right to bear and carry arms
for self-defense. Accordingly, Manney’s reading of the
Court’s recent decisions is too broad.
    Under Manney’s characterizations of § 922(a)(6), any
regulation related to the process of purchasing firearms
would be covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text,
regardless of the conduct the statute regulates. For instance,
even asking an individual to fill out the ATF 4473 form or
making them wait a short time while their application is
processed would come under Second Amendment’s plain
text. But whether a regulation is covered by the Second
Amendment’s plain text must be tied to “the conduct the
regulation prevents [the individual] from engaging in.” Doe
v. Bonta, 

 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Bruen,

). We thus decline to stretch the holding of
Bruen beyond its limits by adopting Manney’s proposed
view of § 922(a)(6).
    Instead, we find that § 922(a)(6) prohibits making false
statements. The statute only relates to firearms insofar as it
regulates statements made in connection with firearm
acquisitions and information “material to the lawfulness of
the sale.” But the regulated conduct is unrelated to the
possession of a firearm. In other words, the statute regulates
statements made by the individual purchasing a firearm to
ensure that a purchaser is not lying to a firearms dealer about
who is purchasing the firearm. The fact that the information
a purchaser provides may trigger a separate statute that may
10                          USA V. MANNEY


bar the purchase of a firearm does not transform § 922(a)(6)
into a statute regulating the possession of firearms. 6
    Taking all of this into consideration, as applied to the
facts of her case, § 922(a)(6) did not violate Manney’s
Second Amendment right. The statute did not prohibit
Manney from possessing firearms as evidenced by her
ability to purchase a firearm shortly before her interaction
with Agent Caron. Nor did it prohibit Manney from
transferring those firearms to another individual. All the
statute did was prohibit Manney from lying about the actual
purchaser of the firearms. 7 Because the Second Amendment

6
   The only other circuit to address a prosecution under § 922(a)(6)
after Bruen came to a similar conclusion, albeit under different
circumstances. In United States v. Holden, 

 (7th Cir.
2023), the Seventh Circuit addressed an as applied challenge to
§ 922(a)(6); there, the appellee argued that his false statement was not
“material” because the statute that precluded him from possessing a
firearm was unconstitutional. 70 F.4th 1016–18. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, finding that Congress is entitled to seek certain information
from would-be purchasers. Id. at 1017 (“The power to collect accurate
information is of a different character—and stands on a firmer footing—
than the power to prohibit particular people from owning guns.”). It also
concluded that the government may punish false statements even when
it is not entitled to demand answers. Id. (“The word ‘material’
in § 922(a)(6) does not create a privilege to lie, when the answer is
material to a statute, whether or not that statute has an independent
constitutional problem.”); see also United States v. Scheidt, 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Completing ATF Form 4473, and adhering
to its attendant truth-telling requirement, is conduct that is outside the
scope of the Second Amendment’s protections, not requiring application
of Bruen’s historical analysis framework.”). We agree.
7
  And the Supreme Court has long held that defendants cannot avoid
punishment for providing false information “in feigned compliance with
a statutory requirement” by “challenging the validity of the requirement
                              USA V. MANNEY                              11


does not protect an individual’s false statements, the conduct
§ 922(a)(6) regulates falls outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s plain text, and our analysis ends here.
    Manney separately argues that her false statement was
not “material” under § 922(a)(6) because 

(g)(1), which prohibits individuals with felony
convictions from possessing firearms, is unconstitutional.
The government argued at trial that Manney’s statement that
she was the actual purchaser of the firearms was false
because she was purchasing them on behalf of her son,
Razaaq. The government also presented evidence that
Razaaq was convicted of a felony, and thus unable to
purchase the firearms himself. Manney contends that
because Razaaq can legally possess firearms, her statement
falsely claiming to be the actual purchaser of the guns is not
“material.”
     There are numerous issues with Manney’s argument.
We address only the most salient issue, which is that this
argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Abramski v. United States, 

 (2014). In
Abramski, the Court held that a false statement regarding the
actual purchaser of a firearm was “material” under
§ 922(a)(6) even if the actual purchaser could legally possess
a firearm. 8 573 U.S. at 171–72. We are bound by precedent.
As such, Manney’s challenge of her conviction fails.




itself.” See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 

 (1969); Kay v.
United States, 

 (1938); LeChance v. Erickson, 

,
267–68 (1998); Dennis v. United States, 

 (1966).
8
    For this reason, we do not address the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).
12                   USA V. MANNEY


                    IV. Conclusion
    We conclude that Manney cannot establish that
§ 922(a)(6) violates her Second Amendment right under the
facts of this case. Therefore, we AFFIRM Manney’s
conviction.