Peter Kleidman v. Rff Family Partnership, Lp

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Peter Kleidman v. Rff Family Partnership, Lp

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 28 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PETER KLEIDMAN, No. 23-55610

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-03947-SPG-AFM v.

MEMORANDUM* RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LP; TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, Chief Justice,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 20, 2024** Before: S.R. THOMAS, RAWLINSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Peter Kleidman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims related to his state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Davidson v.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kleidman’s constitutional claims because Kleidman failed to allege facts sufficient to show that California’s vexatious litigant statute violated his constitutional rights. See Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding as constitutional California’s prefiling requirements on vexatious litigants).

The district court properly dismissed Kleidman’s remaining claims because these claims constituted forbidden “de facto appeal[s]” of a prior state court judgment or were “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to amend because further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

2 23-55610

Reference

Status
Unpublished