Juarez De Leon v. Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDELMIRA LETICIA JUAREZ DE No. 23-4241 LEON; GENESIS VALERIA ACABAL- Agency Nos. JUAREZ; KIMBERLY CARMECITA A220-198-763 ACABAL-JUAREZ, A220-198-762

A220-206-681 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 3, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, OWENS, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Edelmira Leticia Juarez de Leon and her two minor children, *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Genesis Valeria Acabal-Juarez and Kimberly Carmecita Acabal-Juarez (collectively, “Petitioners”), are natives of Guatemala.1 They petition for review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal, in which the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying Petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, humanitarian asylum, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).2

The parties are familiar with the facts, so we recount them only as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition for review.

When a petition fails to “specifically and distinctly argue[] and raise[]” issues for relief, “[petitioner] has waived that claim.” Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). The Government argues that the Petitioner has waived her argument addressing the BIA’s nexus finding. We agree.

Petitioner asserted eligibility for relief based on an extortion scheme she experienced in Guatemala and claimed membership in two particular social groups (“PSG”) comprised of “Guatemalan women who were small business owners” and “poor and vulnerable women.” The IJ determined that Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between those PSGs and the extortion scheme targeting Petitioner in Guatemala. The BIA upheld that factual finding.

When Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, Petitioner listed four reasons for appeal on her notice of appeal, none of which challenged the IJ’s lack of nexus finding. 3 In her current petition, Petitioner’s opening brief contains two sentences addressing the BIA’s nexus finding but does not otherwise expound on the nexus issue.4 Instead, Petitioner focuses only on whether she faced past persecution and whether she is a member of a particular social group. Petitioner does not explain how or why that past persecution was on account of her membership in a particular social group. Without more, Petitioner has waived her challenge to the BIA’s nexus finding. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief . . . [and a] bare assertion does not preserve a claim.”).

Because the lack of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive of her asylum, withholding of removal, and humanitarian asylum claims, Petitioner’s waiver of this issue is dispositive of the whole petition. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016); Belishta v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION DENIED.