FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY,                        No. 22-35986
          Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                     D.C. No.
    v.                                            3:22-cv-05540-
                                                       RJB
ROBERT FERGUSON, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of
Washington,                                          OPINION
               Defendant-Appellee.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
          Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted November 16, 2023
                    Seattle, Washington

                        Filed June 7, 2024

    Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,
    Circuit Judges, and Richard D. Bennett,* District Judge.

                  Opinion by Judge McKeown


*
 The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the
District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
2                 SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


                          SUMMARY**


                 First Amendment/Standing

    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s dismissal of an action brought by Seattle
Pacific University (“SPU”) alleging First Amendment
violations arising from the Washington Attorney General’s
investigation under the Washington Law Against
Discrimination (“WLAD”) into the University’s
employment policies and history.
    SPU is a religious university that prohibits employees
from engaging in same-sex intercourse and marriage. After
receiving complaints, the Washington Attorney General sent
SPU a letter requesting documents related to the University’s
employment policies, employee complaints, and employee
job descriptions. In response, SPU filed suit against the
Washington Attorney General to enjoin the investigation and
any future enforcement of WLAD. The district court
dismissed the suit on the basis of lack of redressability and
Younger abstention.
    Affirming in part, the panel held that SPU failed to allege
a cognizable injury in fact for its retrospective claims
alleging that the Attorney General’s investigation and
request for documents chilled its religious exercise. The
Attorney General’s request for documents carried no stick
because SPU would not face sanctions for ignoring it.
Moreover, although inquiring into the employment
conditions of ministers may offend the First Amendment, an

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
               SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON              3


inquiry into which employees are ministerial is fair game
because the ministerial exception’s status as an affirmative
defense makes some threshold inquiry necessary.
    Reversing in part, the panel held that SPU had standing
for its prospective pre-enforcement injury claims. SPU
evidenced a sufficient intention to continue employment
practices that are arguably proscribed by WLAD, the
Attorney General has not disavowed its intent to investigate
and enforce WLAD against SPU, and SPU’s injury is
redressable. Younger abstention is not warranted because
there are no ongoing enforcement actions or any court
judgment. The panel remanded the district court to consider
prudential ripeness in the first instance.



                       COUNSEL

Lori H. Windham (argued), Joseph C. Davis, Daniel D.
Benson, Laura W. Slavis, and Daniel M. Vitagliano, and
Rich Osborne, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
Washington, D.C.; Nathaniel L. Taylor, Abigail St. Hilaire,
and Daniel J. Ichinaga, Ellis Li & McKinstry PLLC, Seattle,
Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Daniel J. Jeon (argued), David Ward, and Patricio A.
Marquez, Assistant Attorneys General; Robert W. Ferguson,
Washington Attorney General; Office of the Washington
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Seattle,
Washington; for Defendant-Appellee.
Matthew T. Nelson, Conor B. Dugan, and Katherine G.
Boothroyd, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Grand Rapids,
Michigan, for Amicus Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars
Elizabeth A. Clark, Carl H. Esbeck, and Robert J. Pushaw.
4              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

                     INTRODUCTION
     The merits of this lawsuit involve yet another clash
between a state anti-discrimination law and the First
Amendment. But this appeal presents an antecedent
question—whether the federal courts may pass on this
important issue before the Attorney General commences an
enforcement action. Seattle Pacific University (“SPU”) is a
religious university that prohibits employees from engaging
in same-sex intercourse and marriage. After receiving a slew
of complaints, the Washington Attorney General sent SPU a
letter alerting it to an investigation under the Washington
Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) and requesting
documents related to employment policies, employee
complaints, and employee job descriptions. In response,
SPU filed suit against the Washington Attorney General to
enjoin the investigation and any future enforcement of the
WLAD. The question is whether the district court has
jurisdiction to hear this case. Based on a lack of
redressability and Younger abstention, the district court
granted the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss. We
affirm in part and reverse in part. We conclude that SPU has
standing to bring certain claims and that Younger abstention
does not bar the court from considering those claims.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The WLAD declares a “right to be free from
discrimination because of . . . sexual orientation.” 

. The Washington State Human
Rights Commission, created under the WLAD, is charged
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON              5


with investigating and adjudicating complaints of
discriminatory practices. 

 § 49.60.120. In addition, the
Attorney General and private individuals may sue employers
for discriminatory practices. Id. §§ 49.60.030(2), 49.60.350.
    The WLAD exempts religious nonprofit organizations
from its definition of “employer.” Id. § 49.60.040(11). In
2021, however, the Washington Supreme Court determined
that the WLAD’s exemption of all religious nonprofit
employers may violate Article I, Section 12 of the
Washington State Constitution as applied to particular
individuals. See Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission,

 (Wash. 2021) (en banc), cert. denied,

 (2022). That provision of the state
constitution provides, “No law shall be passed granting to
any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or
corporations.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. According to the
Washington Supreme Court, the WLAD’s differential
treatment of religious organizations chafes against this
clause. Woods, 481 P.3d at 1065–67. At the same time, the
court recognized that the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution includes special protections for religious
employers with regard to ministerial employees. Id.1067–
69. Analyzing the interplay between these competing
principles, the court narrowed the WLAD’s religious
employer exemption to be coextensive with the ministerial
exception recognized under federal law. Id. at 1069–70.
    SPU is a private Christian university “under the auspices
of the Free Methodist Church.” Free Methodists believe
“sexual intimacy is a gift from God and is a great blessing in
the sanctity of marriage between one man and one woman.”
In the spirit of this tenet, SPU “requires all of its regular
6               SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


faculty and staff (other than student employees and
temporary employees) . . . to abide by certain lifestyle
expectations in keeping with the University’s religious
beliefs.” Employees are prohibited from engaging in sexual
intimacy outside of marriage, with marriage only recognized
between one man and one woman.
    In January 2021, a faculty applicant sued SPU alleging
sexual orientation discrimination. The case settled, but it
sparked debate within the university. Some students and
faculty called on the Board of Trustees to change its policies,
attracting media coverage. After forming a working group
to study the issue, the Board rebuffed the calls for reform,
voting to retain the existing employee conduct policy.
    The Attorney General has received hundreds of
complaints against SPU related to its employment policy.
Shortly after the Board’s decision, the Attorney General sent
SPU a letter announcing a probe into SPU’s employment
policies and history. The letter requested (1) information
regarding hiring, discipline, and employment policies, (2) a
description of instances when the sexual orientation policies
have been implemented, (3) any complaints from
prospective, current, or former employees, and (4) the job
descriptions for all employees. In addition, the Attorney
General requested the retention of all documents relevant to
the investigation.
    SPU responded to the letter, seeking clarification on the
scope of the probe and the Attorney General’s interpretation
of state and federal law. In reply, the Attorney General
objected to SPU’s lack of compliance with the request.
Instead of tendering the requested documents, SPU filed this
lawsuit. The Attorney General then issued a press release
denouncing SPU’s “illegal discrimination” and soliciting
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON               7


more complaints. The Attorney General also filed a motion
to dismiss the lawsuit arguing that SPU failed to allege an
injury, that any alleged injuries would not be redressable,
that SPU’s claims were not ripe, and that Younger abstention
required dismissal. After SPU filed a First Amended
Complaint (the “Complaint”), the Attorney General refiled
its motion to dismiss on the same grounds.
    The Complaint alleged that the Attorney General’s probe
and future enforcement of the WLAD violated the First
Amendment. Specifically, SPU characterizes the Attorney
General’s actions as retaliation for constitutionally protected
activities, an interference with church autonomy, selective
enforcement of Washington law, and a denominational
preference. Counts II, VI, VII, IX, and X are prospective
pre-enforcement claims challenging the impending
enforcement of the WLAD; Counts I, III, IV, V, and VIII,
and XI are retrospective claims challenging the Attorney
General’s investigation so far.
    At oral argument, the district court questioned the
Attorney General’s counsel on the repercussions of SPU
ignoring the inquiry letter. Counsel replied, “[T]here are no
legal consequences to ignoring our letter. . . . There are no
other consequences.” The district court, ruling from the
bench, dismissed the Complaint.           Assuming without
deciding an injury in fact, the court found that the injury was
not redressable and Younger abstention required dismissal.
                          ANALYSIS
I. Standing
    We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing, and we rest our analysis on the
Complaint’s allegations, which we accept as true at the
8               SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


pleading stage. See Southcentral Found. v. Alaska Native
Tribal Health Consortium, 

, 416–17 (9th Cir.
2020); Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 

 (9th Cir. 2011). To establish standing, SPU must
meet the well-established requirements: “injury in fact,
causation, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will
redress the plaintiff’s alleged injury.” Lopez v. Candaele,

 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, only injury in fact
and redressability are contested.
    A. Investigatory Probe—Injury in Fact
     Six of SPU’s claims allege an injury based on the
Attorney General’s probe to date—Counts I, III, IV, V, VIII,
and XI. SPU contends that the Attorney General’s request
for documents chilled religious exercise, both because SPU
was targeted for retaliation and because the probe intruded
on religious autonomy. This retrospective theory requires us
to disregard any threat of future enforcement and focus on
the Attorney General’s past actions—namely, the request
letter and the general investigation so far. We conclude that
SPU failed to state an injury in fact, and hence these counts
were properly dismissed.
    In a strikingly similar case, Twitter alleged that a Civil
Investigative Demand (“CID”) from the Texas Office of the
Attorney General had a chilling effect on its free speech
rights. Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, 

 (9th Cir.
2022). We held that Twitter’s vague assertions of chilled
speech were insufficient to establish an injury. 

.
Crucially, the CID was non-self-executing: the Texas
Attorney General must petition a court to enforce a CID if
the recipient refuses to comply. 

. We concluded,
“[T]o complain about the CID in this posture is to speculate
about injuries that have not and may never occur.” 

                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON               9


Although we grounded the decision on ripeness, we noted
that the ripeness inquiry is “synonymous with the injury-in-
fact prong of the standing inquiry.” 

 (cleaned up).
     Like the CID in Twitter, the Attorney General’s request
for documents carries no stick: SPU would not face
sanctions for ignoring it. SPU endeavors to cast its injury as
more concrete than that of Twitter, but we are not convinced.
SPU alleges that the Attorney General’s actions “require[d]
[SPU] to make decisions about employment under a cloud
of government investigation and impending penalties” and
that SPU “believes that if it does not comply with the
unconstitutional probe, then it will face serious penalties and
litigation against Constitutionally protected actions.” These
allegations mirror Twitter’s claim that its “ability to freely
make its own decisions as to what content to include on its
platform is impeded by the persistent threat that government
actors who disagree with those decisions may wield their
official authority to retaliate, such as by issuing a
burdensome CID or commencing an intrusive
investigation.” Twitter, 

. SPU’s allegations
are no more concrete.
    As we know, not all First Amendment rights stand on
equal footing. In Twitter, the claimed injury was chilled
speech, not the intrusion into church autonomy. The
Supreme Court has stressed that “the very process of
inquiry” by the government may impinge the rights
guaranteed by the Religion Clauses. NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 

 (1979). Although this
wrinkle distinguishes SPU’s appeal from Twitter, it turns out
to be a distinction without a difference.
   SPU cites a string of cases emphasizing the firewall
between secular employment standards and religious
10                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


organizations. But none of those cases stand for the
proposition that SPU asks us to endorse. In each case, the
question was unquestionably ripe: the agency or judicially
supervised investigation was exercising its coercive power.
See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists,

, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Church personnel and
records would inevitably become subject to subpoena,
discovery, cross-examination, the full panoply of legal
process designed to probe the mind of the church in the
selection of its ministers.”).1 SPU’s Complaint proclaims,
“Church autonomy also forbids the ‘forced disclosure’ of
religious organizations’ ‘internal communications.’” But
here, there is no “forced disclosure.” SPU asks us to
judicially shield it from a request for documents that could
simply be ignored. As the Attorney General acknowledges,
there are “no legal consequences” or “other consequences”
flowing from the request. Nothing in the Religion Clauses
transforms the Attorney General’s request into an injury.
    Nor can it be that any investigation into a religious
organization’s employment practices creates a First
Amendment injury. As SPU’s own authorities make clear,
inquiring into the employment conditions of ministers may
offend the First Amendment, but an inquiry into which
employees are ministerial is fair game: “The ministerial
exception’s status as an affirmative defense makes some
threshold inquiry necessary. At the same time, discovery to
determine who is a minister differs materially from
discovery to determine how that minister was treated . . . .”


1
 See also Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit v. NLRB, 

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (challenging an NLRB order to bargain); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Smith, 

, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2018) (raising
a motion to quash a subpoena).
                  SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON                     11


Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 

(7th Cir. 2021) (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 

, 195 n.4
(2012)).
    This distinction is sensible. If the First Amendment
barred any inquiry into religious employers, including an
inquiry into which employees are ministers, the ministerial
exception would be elevated from an affirmative defense to
affirmative immunity, and the Attorney General would have
no point of entry for an investigation of non-ministerial
employees. A religious employer is not given carte blanche
with respect to all employees, ministerial and non-
ministerial alike. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
“[t]his does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a
general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their
autonomy with respect to internal management decisions
that are essential to the institution’s central mission.” Our
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 

 (2020). SPU’s sweeping interpretation of the
ministerial exception would give religious organizations a
vast buffer zone, tantamount to a free pass, protecting far
more than just the “central mission” of the religious
institution. 

 To the contrary, First Amendment
protections serve as a sieve, not a lid.2
    B. Pre-Enforcement Injury In Fact
    A separate framework applies to SPU’s claims asserting
pre-enforcement standing—Counts II, VI, VII, IX, and X.
Pre-enforcement standing injuries are predicated on the

2
 Nor does it matter that the inquiry came from a government probe rather
than from a suit brought by an individual employee. The scope of the
ministerial exception does not fluctuate based on the identity of the
challenging party.
12               SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


anticipated enforcement of the challenged statute in the
future and the resulting chilling effect in the present. Put
simply, pre-enforcement standing hinges on whether a party
has “alleged a sufficiently imminent injury for the purposes
of Article III.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 

, 151 (2014). In Driehaus, the Supreme Court offered up
three benchmarks to determine whether there is “a credible
threat of enforcement”: (1) a plaintiff must allege “an
intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected
with a constitutional interest,” (2) a plaintiff’s intended
future conduct must be “arguably . . . proscribed by [the]
statute” it wishes to challenge, and (3) the threat of future
enforcement must be “substantial.”3 

 at 161–62, 164
(quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 

(1979)). Under this framework, we conclude that SPU has
alleged a pre-enforcement injury in fact.
        1. Course of Conduct Affecting a Constitutional
           Interest
    The first Driehaus prong requires that the plaintiff has
“an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably
affected with a constitutional interest.” 

 at 161 (quoting
Babbitt, 

). As a religious university with
specific parameters undergirding its employment practices,
SPU’s employment decisions are plainly affected with First
Amendment interests. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 

. The real question is whether SPU has sufficient
intention to act.



3
 See Peace Ranch, LLC v. Bonta, 

, 486–87 (9th Cir. 2024),
for a synopsis of the evolution of Ninth Circuit caselaw on pre-
enforcement standing.
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON              13


    The Attorney General posits that “[i]n the absence of any
fact allegation by SPU of how it plans to refuse to hire, fire,
or otherwise discriminate against non-ministerial employees
because of their sexual orientation, SPU fails to show that it
intends to act in a course of conduct proscribed by the
WLAD.” But the Attorney General misunderstands the
inquiry. To be sure, bare bones pleadings merely asserting
that the plaintiffs are subject to the challenged law are not
enough. See Carrico, 656 F.3d at 1006–07. Some of our
precedents suggest that pre-enforcement standing requires
the “when, to whom, where, or under what circumstances”
the plaintiff plans to violate the law. See Unified Data
Servs., LLC v. FTC, 

 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Lopez, 

). When, however, a
plaintiff has previously engaged in conduct that would
violate the challenged law, we have relaxed the requisite
level of detail. See Tingley v. Ferguson, 

, 1068
(9th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e do not require plaintiffs to specify
‘when, to whom, where, or under what circumstances’ they
plan to violate the law when they have already violated the
law in the past.” (citation omitted)).
    SPU has evidenced a sufficient intention to continue its
employment practices. In the face of faculty and student
pressure to change its policies, the Board voted to retain the
existing employee conduct policy prohibiting same-sex
marriage and intimacy. SPU further alleges that it “would
be automatically disaffiliated from the Free Methodist
Church” if it permitted employment of “Christians in same-
sex marriages.” These allegations suffice to meet the
requirement of “an intention to engage in a course of
conduct” that intersects with the claimed First Amendment
interest. Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 161 (citation omitted).
14              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


       2. Conduct Arguably Proscribed by Washington
          Law
    SPU’s employment practices are arguably proscribed by
Washington         law,   which      prohibits     employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The
Attorney General essentially agrees but counters that,
because the WLAD does not affect ministerial employees,
SPU’s hiring practices are not proscribed. But that argument
is circular: it is tantamount to saying that so long as SPU is
not violating the WLAD, the WLAD does not prohibit its
hiring practices. This reasoning, of course, collapses on
itself in this situation. The Complaint is crystal clear that
SPU has applied and will continue to apply its sexual
conduct policies to all regular faculty and staff, ministers and
non-ministers alike. These policies arguably violate the
WLAD, even according to the Attorney General. In its letter
requesting documents, the Attorney General stated that
SPU’s employment policies are “possibl[y] discriminatory”
and “may violate the Washington Law Against
Discrimination.” Even more pointed, in a press release after
SPU filed its initial Complaint, the Attorney General
denounced SPU’s “illegal discrimination” and solicited
more complaints. Thus, SPU’s course of conduct is arguably
proscribed by the WLAD.
       3. Substantial Threat of Enforcement
    The final Driehaus factor requires a substantial threat of
enforcement, which is often linked to the enforcing
authority’s willingness to disavow enforcement. See LSO,
Ltd. v. Stroh, 

, 1154–56 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“While we cannot go so far as to say that a plaintiff has
standing whenever the Government refuses to rule out use of
the challenged provision, failure to disavow ‘is an attitudinal
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON              15


factor the net effect of which would seem to impart some
substance to the fears of [plaintiffs].’” (quoting Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 

 (9th Cir. 1991))). Here, the Attorney General has not
disavowed its intent to investigate and enforce the WLAD
against SPU. Instead, in a press release responding to this
lawsuit, the Attorney General affirmatively solicited more
complaints of “possible employment discrimination by
Seattle Pacific University.”
     The letter requesting documents and a litigation retention
hold is also a clear sign of a substantial threat. See Spokane
Indian Tribe v. United States, 

 (9th Cir.
1992) (upholding jurisdiction when the United States
Attorney’s Office sent a letter informing the tribe that its
“Pick 6” lotto violated state and federal law and requesting
discontinuation). Without doubt, the Attorney General’s
letter caused SPU to have a “real and reasonable
apprehension that [it] will be subject to liability.” 

(quoting Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

 (9th Cir. 1990)). The letter stated that
“[t]he AGO has recently learned about possible
discriminatory employment policies and practices by Seattle
Pacific University that may violate the Washington Law
Against Discrimination” and informed SPU that “the AGO
is opening an inquiry to determine whether the University is
meeting its obligations under state law.” The letter further
enclosed a “certification regarding the retention of
documents” and requested that SPU “maintain in their
current forms all records, documents, files, and
electronically stored material that may be relevant to this
investigation.” Thus, the letter clearly raises the specter of
potential administrative or judicial proceedings. This course
of conduct is hardly without consequence.
16              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


    Taken as a whole, the allegations in the Complaint
satisfy the Driehaus test and establish an injury with respect
to Counts II, VI, VII, IX, and X.
     C. Redressability
    For an injury to be redressable, it must be “likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 

 (1992) (cleaned up). Here, the
redressability of SPU’s alleged injury is plain:

        When the suit is one challenging the legality
        of government action or inaction, the nature
        and extent of facts that must be averred (at the
        summary judgment stage) or proved (at the
        trial stage) in order to establish standing
        depends considerably upon whether the
        plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or
        forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is
        ordinarily little question that the action or
        inaction has caused him injury, and that a
        judgment preventing or requiring the action
        will redress it.

 at 561–62. SPU is challenging the future enforcement
action of a state actor, and the court has the power to enjoin
the action or issue relief through a declaration of rights. See
e.g., Ted Cruz for Senate v. FEC, 

, 5–6
(D.D.C. 2021) (invalidating and enjoining the enforcement
of Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002), aff’d sub nom., FEC v. Cruz, 

 (2022).
    The district court, however, rejected redressability for
three reasons: (1) the prohibition on advisory opinions bars
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON               17


declaratory relief, (2) a federal court cannot change state
law, and (3) an injunction would impermissibly entangle the
court with a religious institution. As we explain, none of the
rationales defeat redressability.
       1. Declaratory Relief
    The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, “[i]n a case
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of
the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 

(a). Decades ago, the Supreme Court anointed
the Declaratory Judgment Act as constitutional. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 

, 240–41
(1937).
    The district court, however, eschewed its power to issue
declaratory relief. It correctly noted that Article III courts
“don’t issue advisory opinions,” but then jumped to the
conclusion that the court cannot grant declaratory relief in
this case. To be sure, “[t]here was a time” when the courts
“harbored doubts about the compatibility of declaratory-
judgment actions with Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 

 (2007). But the Supreme Court has long since
“dispelled” such doubts. 

 Declaratory relief does not
necessarily translate into an advisory opinion. See e.g.,
Skyline Wesleyan Church v. Cal. Dep’t of Managed Health
Care, 

 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that
declaratory relief could redress the alleged injury); Clark v.
City of Lakewood, 

 (9th Cir. 2001), as
amended (Aug. 15, 2001) (“If a plaintiff has standing to seek
injunctive relief, the plaintiff also has standing to seek a
declaratory judgment.”).
18              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


     At the edges, there may be some ambiguity as to which
declaratory-judgment actions are justiciable under Article
III. But this ambiguity generally arises with respect to injury
in fact or ripeness, and in any event, this is not an edge case.
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court took up the ripeness of a
case in which a “plaintiff’s self-avoidance of imminent
injury is coerced by threatened enforcement action of a
private party rather than the government.” 

.
The Court began with the “recognition” that “where
threatened action by government is concerned, we do not
require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before
bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat—for
example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be
enforced.” 

 at 128–29. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
plaintiffs with pre-enforcement injuries to seek declaratory
relief. See, e.g., Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 154; Steffel v.
Thompson, 

 (1974); Peace Ranch, LLC v.
Bonta, 

 (9th Cir. 2024); LSO, 

. Thus, there is a wealth of precedent supporting the
redressability of pre-enforcement injuries with declaratory
relief. SPU requests a declaratory judgment that the First
Amendment protects its employment decisions and that the
Attorney General cannot target SPU in a retaliatory or non-
neutral manner—a request that falls well within traditional
declaratory relief.
       2. Changing State Law
    We do not read SPU’s claims as an effort for us to rewrite
state laws. The district court saw it otherwise, stating, “[A]
careful examination of [SPU’s requests for injunctive relief]
indicates that plaintiffs are asking for a change to the state
law against discrimination, or for limits to it, and also,
possibly, limits on the state attorney general’s investigatory
authority. This Court doesn’t have the power to change the
               SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON               19


state law.” Obviously, federal courts do not have the power
to rewrite or change state statutes with a red pen, but our
decisions may properly delineate constitutional limits on
state statutes.
    The pre-enforcement posture of this appeal does not alter
our conclusion. In Tingley v. Ferguson, a licensed therapist
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a Washington state law
prohibiting the practice of conversion therapy on children.
47 F.4th at 1063. We held that, although the plaintiff’s
claims were ultimately without merit, he had standing to
seek injunctive relief. Id. at 1091. Similarly, in Wolfson v.
Brammer, the Ninth Circuit clarified:

       These defendants have the power to
       discipline Wolfson and, if they are enjoined
       from enforcing the challenged provisions,
       Wolfson will have obtained redress in the
       form of freedom to engage in certain
       activities without fear of punishment. . . . It is
       true that Wolfson cannot obtain revision of
       the Code from these defendants, but Wolfson
       may nevertheless obtain a form of effective
       redress in this action.

, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2010).
    The fact that private parties remain free to sue SPU does
not undercut redressability. Private enforcement is simply
an additional available remedy. It is true that the
redressability prong of standing cannot be met when redress
depends on “the unfettered choices made by independent
actors.” ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 

 (1989).
But that is not the circumstance here. Potential declaratory
or injunctive relief would directly redress the injury
20              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


stemming from the Attorney General’s threat of
enforcement. That private actors could also seek to enforce
the WLAD does not defeat the court’s ability to redress
harms specific to the Attorney General.
   In short, we have the authority to address the
constitutionality of the Washington law as applied to SPU.
        3. Entanglement with Religion
    The district court also found SPU’s injury non-
redressable because injunctive relief would force the court
to violate the Religion Clauses. The court framed the issue
as a catch-22: if the court does nothing, then the Attorney
General may be entangled with religion; but if the court
enjoins the action, then the court must become entangled
with religion. This is a false dilemma.
    As already noted, neither the court nor the Attorney
General would violate the Religion Clauses by inquiring into
which employees are ministerial. As a consequence, issuing
a limited injunction would not necessarily entangle the court
in religion. More fundamentally, redressability should not
be conflated with the merits. SPU need only show that the
court could fashion an injunction that could redress its
injuries. Wolfson, 

 (“A plaintiff meets the
redressability requirement if it is likely, although not certain,
that his injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.”).
The scope of any injunctive relief—such as a narrow
injunction related to ministerial employment—hinges on a
merits determination, not redressability. For example, if the
court were to find some aspects of SPU’s First Amendment
claims to be meritorious, the court could enjoin certain
aspects of the investigation or enforcement of the WLAD
against SPU. See, e.g., 

.
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON               21


    An evaluation of SPU’s specific injunctive requests is
unnecessary at this stage. The district court has discretion to
fashion its own equitable relief. As Justice Douglas wrote:

       The essence of equity jurisdiction has been
       the power of the Chancellor to do equity and
       to mould each decree to the necessities of the
       particular case.      Flexibility rather than
       rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
       mercy and practicality have made equity the
       instrument for nice adjustment and
       reconciliation between the public interest and
       private needs as well as between competing
       private claims.

Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 

, 329–30 (1944). It may
be, as the litigation unfolds, that declaratory relief redresses
the injury and injunctive relief is unnecessary. Alternatively,
it may be appropriate for the court to proactively narrow the
scope of potential subpoenas. Or, of course, it may be that
SPU’s claims are without merit and no remedy is warranted.
The range of remedies underscores that the district court has
the power to redress the alleged injury.
II. Younger Abstention
    We next consider whether the case should have been
dismissed under Younger v. Harris, 

 (1971), an
issue we review de novo. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Connors, 

 (9th Cir. 2020). In Younger, the
Supreme Court declared a “national policy forbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances.” 

. We invoke a “five-prong test” to determine whether a
civil case is Younger-eligible: “Younger abstention is
22              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are
ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or
involve a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state
interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges.”
Rynearson v. Ferguson, 

, 924–25 (9th Cir.
2018) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp.
Ins. Fund, 

 (9th Cir. 2014)). Because there
are no ongoing enforcement actions or any court judgment,
abstention under Younger is not warranted.
    To begin, there is no state court proceeding here. Nor is
there an administrative proceeding or other enforcement
action. And clearly, a prosecuting or enforcing entity’s
investigation alone is neither a “quasi-criminal enforcement
action[]” nor an enforcement action at all. See Rynearson,
903 F.3d at 924–25. The Attorney General has no
independent authority to sanction SPU under the WLAD.

, 46.60.250, 46.60.340. As a
result, the investigation “cannot be said to have been brought
‘to sanction the federal plaintiff . . . for some wrongful act,’
which is the quintessential feature of a Younger-eligible
‘civil enforcement action.’” Applied Underwriters, Inc. v.
Lara, 

 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 

 (2013)).
    Faced with these obvious problems, the Attorney
General attempts another route to Younger abstention—the
district court properly abstained because the investigation is
an extension of soon-to-be-initiated state court proceedings,
even though no complaint has yet been filed. Under this
theory, however, the state court proceedings are not
“ongoing.”
                SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON             23


    The Attorney General’s threat of enforcement in this
case is sandwiched between pre-enforcement standing and
the initiation of state proceedings. It has long been
established that the mere threat of state enforcement is
insufficient to justify federal court abstention.        See
Steffel, 

 (holding that Younger does not
prevent federal declaratory relief “when a state prosecution
has been threatened, but is not pending”). Indeed, if there
were no daylight between the invocation of pre-enforcement
standing and the start of Younger abstention, then litigants
would have virtually no opportunity to seek federal review
of state laws infringing on constitutional rights.
     Prior to a threat of enforcement, no Article III standing
exists.     After state proceedings commence, Younger
abstention prohibits federal court intervention for the
duration of the proceedings. After state proceedings have
concluded, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely bar
federal courts from reviewing the state court decision with
narrow exceptions. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 

, 1005–06 (1994). And so, the question of what space
exists between the start of pre-enforcement standing and the
start of “ongoing” state proceedings may dictate many
litigants’ opportunity to seek a federal remedy at all. See
Telco Commc’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 

, 1229
(4th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he period between the threat of
enforcement and the onset of formal enforcement
proceedings may be an appropriate time for a litigant to bring
its First Amendment challenges in federal court. Indeed, if
this time is never appropriate, any opportunity for federal
adjudication of federal rights will be lost.”).
    The Attorney General points to precedent establishing
that state court proceedings can be “ongoing” in the
investigation stage. True, but these cases are inapposite
24              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


because proceedings were actually initiated. See Partington
v. Gedan, 

 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended
(July 2, 1992) (“[The claim] is based in part on the Rule 2
disciplinary investigation. In that regard, it clearly seeks
relief with respect to a pending state proceeding.”); see also
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Com. Pol. Action
Comm. v. City of San Jose, 

 (9th Cir.
2008) (“The state-initiated proceeding in this case—the
Elections Commission’s investigation of Plaintiffs’
activities—is ongoing.”), abrogated on other grounds by
Sprint Commc’ns, 

. A state supreme court
disciplinary proceeding and an election commission
investigation are exceptional and not comparable to a run-
of-the-mill Attorney General investigation to determine if
further action is warranted.
    More specifically, in those cases applying Younger
abstention in the investigation stage, the investigative entity
had independent authority to sanction or discipline the
target. See Partington, 

; San Jose Silicon
Valley Chamber, 

. In other words, there
was no need to file with a separate adjudicative body. This
understanding comports with the Supreme Court’s guidance
that the proceeding must be “judicial in nature.” See Ohio
C.R. Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 

 (1986) (“Because we found that the administrative
proceedings in Middlesex were ‘judicial in nature’ from the
outset, it was not essential to the decision that they had
progressed to state-court review by the time we heard the
federal injunction case.” (citation omitted)).             An
investigation alone is not enough, but when the entity is
vested with enforcement or adjudicatory power, then the
investigation may signal an ongoing quasi-judicial
proceeding. Put differently, when the investigative entity
                   SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON                      25


and the adjudicative entity are separate, “ongoing”
proceedings begin with the first filing with the adjudicative
body; but when the adjudicative body also has investigatory
responsibilities, a functional approach governs.
    The Attorney General, unlike the Washington State
Human Rights Commission and Washington administrative
law judges, cannot independently sanction SPU. 

, 46.60.250, 46.60.340. Rather, the
Attorney General must file a lawsuit in state court to enforce
the WLAD, something he has yet to do. See 

. This ends the Younger inquiry. The
district court should not have abstained under Younger.
III. Prudential Ripeness
    Finally, we consider whether, at the Attorney General’s
instigation, we should affirm the district court on prudential
ripeness grounds, although the district court did not address
this issue.4 Prudential ripeness is discretionary. Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 

, 1142 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). “[T]wo overarching considerations”
animate the doctrine: “the fitness of the issues for judicial
review and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Id. at 1141 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 

 (1967)). The first consideration
gives credence to the principle that “a court cannot decide
constitutional questions in a vacuum.” Alaska Right to Life
Pol. Action Comm. v. Feldman, 

 (9th Cir.
2007); see also Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141 (“The record

4
  The Attorney General also argues that SPU has failed to allege
constitutional ripeness. The analysis for constitutional ripeness and pre-
enforcement injury is the same. See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138. As
discussed above, SPU has established a pre-enforcement injury;
therefore, SPU has established constitutional ripeness.
26              SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON


before us is remarkably thin and sketchy, consisting only of
a few conclusory affidavits. A concrete factual situation is
necessary to delineate the boundaries of what conduct the
government may or may not regulate.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). The second consideration
weighs the hardships to the parties—particularly, plaintiffs
who have already demonstrated a constitutional injury.
“Evaluating whether withholding judicial review presents a
hardship requires looking at whether the challenged law
‘requires an immediate and significant change in the
plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs with serious penalties
attached to noncompliance.’” Tingley, 47 F.4th at 1070–71
(quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 

 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
    We note that the Supreme Court in dictum has
questioned the “continued vitality” of prudential ripeness
doctrine: “To the extent respondents would have us deem
petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable on grounds that are
prudential, rather than constitutional, that request is in some
tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that a
federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its
jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at
167 (cleaned up). The Court appears to have walked up to
the line but stopped short of abrogating the doctrine.
    Because the district court did not rule on this issue
below, and instead granted the motion to dismiss on standing
and Younger abstention grounds, we remand to the district
court to consider the issue in the first instance.
                        CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Counts I, III,
IV, V, VIII, and XI, because we determine that SPU failed
to allege a cognizable injury in fact for its retrospective
               SEATTLE PAC. UNIV. V. FERGUSON           27


claims. In contrast, we conclude that SPU has standing for
its prospective pre-enforcement injury claims—Counts II,
VI, VII, IX, and X—and therefore reverse the dismissal of
those claims. Younger abstention does not support dismissal
of SPU’s Complaint. We remand to the district court to
consider prudential ripeness.
   Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.
   AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.