Larry Johnson v. Thomas Brenneke, Jr.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LARRY JOHNSON, No. 23-35542
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. Nos. 3:21-cv-00582-JR
3:21-cv-00685-JR v. 3:21-cv-00871-JR
THOMAS BARRY BRENNEKE, Jr.; et al.,
MEMORANDUM* Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Jolie A. Russo, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted February 18, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Larry Johnson,1 proceeding pro se, appeals the district *
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. court’s dismissal of three consolidated cases filed in the District of Oregon against Defendants-Appellees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM.
Plaintiff filed several claims related to accommodations under the Federal Housing Act against many parties, including Defendants.2 Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, and Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the district court grant summary judgment to Defendants because, among other things, Defendants had provided several accommodations requested by Plaintiff; Defendants had not retaliated against Plaintiff for requesting accommodations; and Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a nexus between his disability and certain requested accommodations. The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation, denied Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment to Defendants. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de Johnson v. Guardian Mgmt., No. 22-35775, 2024 WL 3508053 (9th Cir. July 23, 2024) (affirming the dismissal of other claims brought by Plaintiff and Hume, as co- plaintiffs, against Defendants Guardian Management, Lisa Simonson, Kelly Paine, Thomas Barry Brenneke, Jr., Guardian Real Estate Services, and Uptown Tower Apartments). Hume was not a party to the three cases at issue in this appeal, has not filed any a brief or pleading in this appeal, and is not a party to this appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Fed. R. App. P. 3(b). novo. See Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff’s pro se Informal Opening Brief appears to argue that we should remand to the district court to address the “fundamental issue of the nexus/connection aspect of reasonable accommodation as a basis for Motion(s) to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.”3 But insofar as the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation relied on Plaintiff’s failure to establish a nexus between the accommodations sought and Plaintiff’s alleged disability, it was correct. See, e.g., Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]here must be a ‘causal link’ between the requested accommodation and the plaintiff’s disability.” (quoting Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003))).
Plaintiff also alleges that “during the course of this Fair Housing Act litigation concerning basic fundamental rights [Plaintiff] became ill and was hospitalized at a geriatric psychiatric hospital. The Magistrate Court denied a stay of the proceedings despite a medical recommendation request by his medical provider.” We review a district court’s order denying a stay for abuse of discretion. See Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). “A district court abuses its discretion if it ‘base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).
Plaintiff filed two motions requesting a stay of proceedings, the first of which was denied and the second of which was granted. We thus construe Plaintiff’s claim before us regarding his request for a stay as referencing only his first (denied) request. The Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s request, finding that “Plaintiff’s supporting materials [did] not demonstrate that a stay [was] warranted.” We have reviewed those materials, and we conclude that the Magistrate Judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Plaintiff’s first request for a stay.
Plaintiff identifies no other grounds for relief. And although we are “sensitive to [an appellant’s] pro se status . . . , our leniency is not without limit and does not excuse [an] utter failure to provide any legal support or argument.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 723 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014). Remand is accordingly not warranted.4
AFFIRMED.
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