Casillas v. Clark

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARCO ANTONIO CASILLAS, No. 23-2213 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 2:21-cv-01267-SPG-MAR v. MEMORANDUM* KEN CLARK, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 5, 2025 Pasadena, California Before: TALLMAN, CLIFTON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Marco Antonio Casillas appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree murder committed during a burglary, for which he received a life sentence without parole. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Earp v. Davis, 881 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

1. We review Casillas’ claim that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Casillas argues that in resolving this claim on state evidentiary grounds, the California Court of Appeal inadvertently overlooked his federal constitutional claim, warranting de novo review on appeal.

See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301–03 (2013) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies only to claims adjudicated on the merits). We disagree. In his brief on direct appeal, Casillas presented his third-party defense claim as one implicating his federal constitutional rights. Thus, we “presume[] that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). So long as the state court “heard and evaluated the evidence and the parties’ substantive arguments,” this presumption applies. Johnson, 568 U.S. at 302 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1199 (9th ed. 2009)).

2. The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial court’s exclusion of Casillas’ third-party culpability evidence did not violate due process was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In rare cases, the application of an otherwise valid state evidentiary rule can violate due process. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). However, the

The exculpatory value of the excluded evidence is also minimal in light of the overwhelming physical evidence placing Casillas at the scene of the crime shortly before the murder took place. See Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983) (observing that the third-party culpability evidence in Chambers

3. We decline to issue a certificate of appealability as to whether the admission of Semchenko’s identification of Casillas violated Casillas’ due process rights.1 To obtain a certificate of appealability, Casillas “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Although the identification may have been the product of impermissibly suggestive circumstances, Casillas was not prejudiced by its admission. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). Even without Semchenko’s identification, the DNA evidence, fingerprints, palmprint, and internet searches the police discovered on Casillas’ computers provided powerful evidence that Casillas murdered Bush.

AFFIRMED.