James Jackson, Jr. v. Pacific Union Financial, LLC

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

James Jackson, Jr. v. Pacific Union Financial, LLC

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES R. JACKSON, Jr.; SUZETTE No. 23-55811 JACKSON, D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellants, 3:23-cv-01285-CAB-BLM

v. MEMORANDUM* PACIFIC UNION FINANCIAL, LLC, DBA Clearvision Funding; FANNIE MAE, as Trustee for securitized trust guaranteed Remic 2014-2019 trust; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, AKA Pacific Union Financial; DOES, Unknown; 1 through 100,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). James R. Jackson, Jr. and Suzette Jackson appeal pro se from the district

court’s order dismissing their foreclosure-related action. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017).

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of the Jacksons’ action was proper because the Jacksons failed to

allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 796 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a defect in an

assignment of a deed of trust into a securitized trust is not void, but merely

voidable, and that borrowers lack standing to challenge such assignments).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Jacksons’ “motion for order to define 2924m(a)(1)” (Docket Entry No.

21) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 23-55811

Reference

Status
Unpublished