NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 6 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EDA YAMILETH QUINTEROS No. 24-4367 ALVARADO; W.Y.B.Q., Agency Nos.

A201-781-875

Petitioners, A201-781-876 v.

MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 4, 2025**

Pasadena, California Before: HURWITZ, MILLER, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Eda Yamileth Quinteros Alvarado and her daughter, natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying their

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for substantial evidence. Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). We deny the petition.

1. The Board correctly concluded that petitioners’ proposed particular social group of “female, single mothers, who are involved in community activities living in San Miguel, El Salvador” is not cognizable. The group is not defined with particularity because there is no “clear benchmark for determining who” is or is not involved in community activities. Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014)).

Even assuming cognizability, the Board’s finding that petitioners did not show a nexus between their harm and their membership in the proposed particular social group is supported by substantial evidence. To show nexus, a petitioner must demonstrate that a social group was, for asylum, “one central reason,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), and, for withholding, “a reason,” for her harm, id. § 1231(b)(3)(C); see Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021). Quinteros Alvarado stated that, after her community environmental organization began to give trainings in San Sebastian, El Salvador, a gang member told her that if she continued to “come to that place,” she “would suffer the consequences of

2 24-4367 having entered their territory.” It was therefore reasonable for the Board to conclude that the gang targeted her “because she had entered the gang’s territory, not because of her involvement in environmental activities.”

2. The immigration judge denied petitioners’ CAT claim on two grounds, concluding that petitioners did not show that they were more likely than not to be tortured if returned to El Salvador or that the Salvadoran government would be more likely than not to acquiesce in any harm. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a); Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). Before the Board, petitioners did not respond to the immigration judge’s finding that they failed to meet their burden of showing that it was more likely than not that they would be tortured if returned to El Salvador. Before this court, they do not challenge the Board’s conclusion that they forfeited any challenge to the immigration judge’s determination regarding likelihood of future torture. Petitioners have therefore forfeited their CAT claim before this court as well.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.

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