NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID W. No. 24-1091 STAUFFER, Attorney; LAURA L. D.C. No. STAUFFER, 3:23-cv-01136-AN Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.

JUDITH H. MATARAZZO; STATE OF OREGON COURTS; ANNA K. SORTUN; TONKON TORP GALEN MARMADUKE & BOOTH, LLP; FITBIT, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Adrienne C. Nelson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2025**

Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Pro se plaintiffs David W. Stauffer and Laura L. Stauffer appeal from the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). district court’s judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action regarding their state court

lawsuit against defendant Fitbit, Inc. We review de novo dismissals under both the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Benavidez

v. City of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2021). The denial of leave to

amend is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284

F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Stauffers’ Section 1983 claims

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claims amounted to a forbidden

“de facto appeal” of a state court judgment and were “inextricably intertwined”

with that judgment. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163–65 (9th Cir. 2003). The

Stauffers allege that the defendants collectively deprived them of their Seventh

Amendment jury trial right when the state court dismissed their complaint

following an arbitration award. The Stauffers now seek, in federal court,

reimbursement for $38,688 in medical bills and lost wages, noneconomic and

punitive damages against Fitbit to induce it to take its product off the market, and

for this court to require Judge Matarazzo to assign the case for a jury trial.

This case plainly falls within the ambit of Rooker-Feldman. Here, the

Stauffers (1) “assert[] as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by state

court,” that is, Judge Matarazzo’s decision to dismiss the claims rather than set the

matter for a jury trial, and (2) “seek[] relief from a state court judgment based on

2 24-1091 that decision” by requesting that this matter be set for trial and that this court award

the damages originally sought in state court. Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474

F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164).1

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Stauffers’

claims with prejudice without granting leave to amend. The district court need not

grant leave to amend if the district court “determines that the pleading could not

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the entirety of the complaint is based on the state

court’s refusal to set the case for a jury trial. The jurisdictional deficiencies go to

the heart of the Stauffers’ claims and cannot be cured by amendment.

AFFIRMED.

1 Pursuant to the Stauffers’ request in their opening brief, we take judicial notice of the state court proceedings in Stauffer v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 19CV18956 (Multnomah Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2019). See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 201).

3 24-1091