NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERTO ANDERSON GONZALEZ- No. 23-2292 REYES, Agency No. A208-686-755 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 14, 2025**

Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Roberto Anderson Gonzalez-Reyes, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of the agency’s denial of his claims for asylum and

withholding of removal. Where, as here, the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) cited Matter of Burbano in adopting and affirming the decision of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Immigration Judge (“IJ”), we review the IJ’s decision. Cruz Rendon v. Holder,

(9th Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction pursuant to

,

and we review for substantial evidence factual findings underlying the agency’s

determination that Gonzalez-Reyes is not eligible for asylum or withholding of

removal. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland,

, 831 (9th Cir. 2022).

Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case,

we need not recount it here. We deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Gonzalez-

Reyes did not demonstrate that the Salvadoran government is or was unable to

protect him from gang members’ threats. The IJ acknowledged the prevalence of

gangs in El Salvador described in the recent Department of State Country Report,

but also noted the country’s efforts to crack down on gang violence and incarcerate

gang members. While sympathetic to Gonzalez-Reyes’s belief that reporting to the

police might be dangerous, the IJ concluded that simply reciting that subjective

belief and submitting background evidence did not demonstrate that government

authorities were unable or unwilling to protect him. Gonzalez-Reyes does not raise

any new argument or point to any evidence compelling a contrary conclusion on

appeal. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,

(9th Cir. 2019)

(“Under [the substantial evidence] standard, we must uphold the agency

determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”).

2 23-2292 Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of relief based on

Gonzalez-Reyes’s failure to corroborate his claims with live testimony from his

father. Under the REAL ID Act, Gonzalez-Reyes was required to submit

reasonably obtainable evidence requested by the IJ to corroborate his testimony.

(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(C). Here, the IJ gave Gonzalez-Reyes

clear advanced notice at a prior hearing to present testimony of live witnesses in

the United States—namely, his asylee father—who had direct or indirect

knowledge of the underlying claims. When asked why his father was not available

to testify, Gonzalez-Reyes offered no explanation why his father could not appear

by video conference from New Jersey. This failure to supply corroborating

evidence or otherwise explain why it was not reasonably obtainable was sufficient

grounds to deny asylum and withholding of removal.

PETITION DENIED.

3 23-2292