NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JANNET SOSA-MERCADO, No. 24-3416

Agency No.

Petitioner, A077-790-764 v.

MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 16, 2025**

San Francisco, California Before: M. SMITH and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BARKER, District Judge.***

Jannet Sosa-Mercado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision to sustain the government’s

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***

The Honorable J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order granting her cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Because we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary part of a decision on cancellation of removal, we dismiss the petition.

Cancellation of removal is a discretionary form of relief, which allows the government to “cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien” meets specific criteria. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). We lack jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229b.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Notwithstanding this general jurisdictional bar, we may review the BIA’s decision for “questions of law raised upon a petition for review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012).

Sosa-Mercado argues we have jurisdiction over her challenge because the BIA engaged in “impermissible fact finding” in reversing the IJ’s discretionary decision to grant her cancellation of removal. Sosa-Mercado argues that the BIA failed to properly apply the de novo review standard to the IJ’s discretionary determination and the clear error review standard to the IJ’s factual findings, which are questions of law.

We disagree. As an example, Sosa-Mercado claims that BIA engaged in fact- finding when it concluded that she only had three positive equities weigh in in her favor when the IJ found six factors in her favor. She claims that the BIA ignored the

2 IJ’s findings of her sobriety since 2017, her concern for her children, and her interest in becoming a drug counselor when she gets out of immigration custody. But the BIA expressly cited all of these facts in its decision and credited her “acceptance of responsibility” and “continued efforts and desire to remain sober.” Instead, the BIA found that her undisputed criminal history “outweigh[s]” any positive equities. How the BIA weighs the equities is not a “question of law,” and we lack jurisdiction to review it. See § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 n.4 (2024) (“[The] step-two discretionary determination on whether or not to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is not reviewable as a question of law.”).

PETITION DISMISSED.

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