NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 14 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FRANCISCO VASQUEZ ROMERO, No. 22-2084

Agency No.

Petitioner, A099-676-957 v.

MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 19, 2025** Before: SILVERMAN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Francisco Vasquez Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”), and cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). We review for substantial evidence whether the agency erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We deny the petition for review.

We do not disturb the agency’s determination that Vasquez Romero failed to show he suffered harm that rose to the level of persecution. See Mendez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 865, 869 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (unspecified threats were insufficient to rise to the level of persecution); see also Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633 n.2 (9th Cir. 2022) (court need not resolve whether de novo or substantial evidence review applies, where result would be the same under either standard). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Vasquez Romero failed to show a reasonable possibility of future persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future persecution was “too speculative”). Thus, Vasquez Romero’s asylum claim fails.

Because Vasquez Romero failed to show eligibility for asylum, he failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1183 (9th Cir. 2021). In light of this disposition, we need not reach Vasquez Romero’s remaining contentions regarding the merits of his asylum and

2 22-2084 withholding of removal claims. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

Vasquez Romero does not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that he waived review of the IJ’s denial of CAT protection, so we do not address it. See Lopez- Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013). We do not address Vasquez Romero’s contentions as to the merits of his CAT claim because the BIA did not deny relief on these grounds. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

As to cancellation of removal, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Vasquez Romero has not shown exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives. See Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006 (petitioner must show hardship “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves the country” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We reject as unsupported by the record Vasquez Romero’s contention that the agency used the wrong legal standard in assessing the hardship.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

3 22-2084 The motion to stay removal is otherwise denied.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

4 22-2084