NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 20 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ANDREW J.J. WOLF, No. 23-35285

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00264-REP

v. MEMORANDUM* IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION; DEBRA FIELD, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; DAVID MCCLUSKEY, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; CINDY WILSON, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; HENRY ATENCIO, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; JEFF ZMUDA, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; ASHLEY DOWELL, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; SHANNON CLUNEY, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; RANDY BLADES, Warden, each sued in their individual and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. official capacities, and their successors in office; JAMIE HESS SMITH, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; MARK KUBINSKI, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; BRENDA BAUGES, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; KEITH YORDY, Warden, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; GARRETT COBURN, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; RANDY VALLEY, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; TIM MCKAY, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; 3 OAKS MINISTRIES; BOYD CHIKATULA, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; JESSIE TRUJILLO, each sued in their individual and official capacities, and their successors in office; J DOES 1-20; JOSH TEWALT; DODDS HAYDEN; KAREN NEILL; CHAD PAGE; AMANDA GENTRY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho Raymond Edward Patricco, Jr., Magistrate Judge, Presiding

2 Submitted October 20, 2025 **

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the

defendants in his action alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Person’s Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and Idaho Free

Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA), Idaho Code § 73-402. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review discovery orders, including

sanction orders, for an abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de

novo. Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 822 (9th

Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s

discovery and related sanction motions. Plaintiff has not demonstrated “actual and

substantial prejudice” from the denial of any specific discovery. See Hallett v.

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the standard of review

and prejudice requirement). Nor has plaintiff identified specific discovery that he

sought that would have prevented summary judgment. See Nidds v. Schindler

Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a party seeking

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 3 additional discovery during summary judgment must establish what factual

discovery exists and why it would prevent summary judgment). Similarly, plaintiff

has not identified any abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s

motion for discovery sanctions. As the district court found, defendants provided

extensive discovery to plaintiff, including the only inadvertently omitted discovery

specifically identified by plaintiff.

The district court properly denied the request for default because, contrary to

plaintiff’s assertion, the defendants filed a timely motion to dismiss the amended

complaint.

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the

individual defendants. RLUIPA does not authorize damages against state officials

who are sued in their individual capacities. It only provides for prospective

injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities. Jones v.

Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015).

Summary judgment was proper for the defendants on the RLUIPA/FERPA

injunctive claims. Plaintiff has not established that the prohibition of open flame at

indoor religious ceremonies substantially burdens his ability to use open flame

during mass. The prison allows open flame, including the use of candles and

incense, in the outdoor worship facilities. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

4 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining substantial burden under RLUIPA); Does v.

Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting forth the substantial burden test

under FERPA).

In any event, the defendants established that allowing open flame outside,

but not inside, is the least restrictive means of furthering compelling security

interests of protecting inmates, staff, and property from the dangers arising from

open flame and smoke in confined spaces. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364

(2015) (defining least restrictive means) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ward

v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the “serious safety and

security concerns raised by allowing inmates to possess and use candles.”); cf.

Roles v. Townsend, 64 P.3d 338, 339–40 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the

prison had “compelling interests in eliminating tobacco in prisons” and that the

tobacco-free policy was the least restrictive means of furthering those interests).

Plaintiff has waived his remaining claims by not identifying the specific

claims or alleged error in the body of his opening brief. See Martinez-Serrano v.

INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that issues listed, but not

discussed in the body of the opening brief, have been waived).

5 All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

6