Barton v. Walmart Inc.
Barton v. Walmart Inc.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NATHEN W. BARTON, No. 24-2649
D.C. No. 3:23-cv-05063-DGE
Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* WALMART INC.; JOHN DOE, 1-10,
Defendants - Appellees, and SHOUJING ZHOU,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2025** Before: FRIEDLAND, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Nathen W. Barton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judgment in his action alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), and Washington’s Consumer Electronic Mail Act (“CEMA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants because Barton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Walmart Inc.’s text messages about orders previously placed on its website constituted “solicitations” within the meaning of the TCPA, see 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (defining “telephone solicitation” to mean “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase . . . of . . . goods”), or “commercial electronic text messages” within the meaning of the CEMA, see Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.010(3) (defining commercial electronic text message as “an electronic text message sent to promote . . . goods . . . for sale”).
AFFIRMED.
2 24-2649
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished