NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EMILIO GERVACIO-MELO, No. 25-2107

Agency No.

Petitioner, A216-625-597 v.

MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 4, 2025**

Portland, Oregon Before: McKEOWN and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.***

Emilio Gervacio-Melo (“Gervacio-Melo”) petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of his application for

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***

The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. cancellation of removal. The only question before us is whether Gervacio-Melo fulfilled his burden under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) to demonstrate “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. We review for substantial evidence BIA hardship determinations. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2025). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the [Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”s)] decision and also adds its own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which it relies.” Duran- Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the petition.

The record does not support Gervacio-Melo’s argument that the BIA and IJ failed to consider evidence about his daughter’s young age or the possibility that the child’s mother may not care for her upon Gervacio-Melo’s removal. The IJ noted Gervacio-Melo’s daughter’s age and analyzed circumstances related to her care and schooling before making its determination. Further, Gervacio-Melo points to no evidence to support his claim that the child’s mother may “simply disappear.” Speculative testimony cannot compel a conclusion that Gervacio-Melo satisfied the hardship requirement. See Maini v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that “personal conjecture and speculation . . . is no substitute for substantial evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Moreover, the BIA and IJ were not obligated to specifically address Gervacio-Melo’s country-conditions evidence or his community ties. As to the former, we recently explained that generalized country-conditions evidence “that applies equally to a large proportion of removal cases” cannot satisfy the “extraordinary and extremely unusual” hardship standard. Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007–08. As to the latter, the IJ properly considered Gervacio-Melo’s community ties when it addressed whether granting cancellation of removal would be an appropriate exercise of discretion. But Gervacio-Melo does not explain how that evidence was relevant to the hardship determination, let alone “highly probative” or “potentially dispositive” of hardship. See Castillo v. Barr, 980 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011)). The BIA and IJ thus were not required to consider evidence about community ties for that purpose.

PETITION DENIED.1 1 The stay of removal will dissolve upon the issuance of the mandate.

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