Williams v. Pollard
Williams v. Pollard
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS, No. 24-3582
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:21-cv-00055-RSH-DTF v.
MEMORANDUM* MARCUS POLLARD, Warden; R. BUCKEL, Chief Deputy Warden; O. NAVARRO; KATHLEEN ALLISON, Secretary, CDCR; CONNIE GIPSON, Deputy Director, CDCR,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Robert Steven Huie, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 17, 2025** Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner John Wesley Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). defendants failed to protect him from COVID-19. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Allison, Gipson, Pollard, and Buckel because the undisputed evidence shows that the policies they promulgated and implemented were reasonable responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and Williams failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they participated in or directed any alleged constitutional violation. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1976) (explaining that prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment, even if they actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety, if they responded reasonably to the risk); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206–08 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional violation or if there is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation”).
We do not consider the district court’s summary judgment for defendant Navarro because Williams failed to raise this issue in the opening brief. See Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that an appellant waives an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion
2 24-3582 to appoint an expert because it properly determined that an expert was not necessary for the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine the facts at issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a); Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (standard of review).
Williams’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his notice of appeal, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 24-3582
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished