Belinda Muhammad v. Bretanniyia Jenkins

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BELINDA C. MUHAMMAD, No. 23-55287 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-07970-JAK-PVC v. BRETANNIYIA JENKINS, Bus Driver for MEMORANDUM* LACMTA, individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee, and LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; PHILLIP A.

WASHINGTON; JANE DOE; DOES, 1-10, Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 13, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Belinda C. Muhammad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment after a jury trial in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Bretanniyia Jenkins called 911 in retaliation for Muhammad’s exercise of First Amendment rights when Muhammad was a passenger on a Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) bus driven by Jenkins. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (evidentiary rulings); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (denial of motion to appoint counsel). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Muhammad’s motions in limine to exclude evidence of her misdemeanor conviction for possession of brass knuckles at the time of the incident and her dismissed charge for resisting arrest. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (setting forth purposes for which evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible); Duran, 221 F.3d at 1132-33 (setting forth the standard for admission of “other act” evidence). Even if we assume error in admitting evidence of the brass knuckles discovered after the encounter, any error would be harmless under the circumstances. See Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a “true threat,” an

2 23-55287 expression of an intent to inflict injury on another, is not protected by the First Amendment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint counsel for Muhammad. See Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (explaining that there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil actions, but court may appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) under “exceptional circumstances,” taking into account the likelihood of success on the merits and the petitioner’s ability to articulate their claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved).

AFFIRMED.

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