Bracamonte-Palma v. Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARCO BRACAMONTE-PALMA, No. 23-970 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-577-995 v. MEMORANDUM** TODD BLANCHE*, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted September 11, 2024 Submission Deferred March 12, 2025 Resubmitted January 22, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: RAWLINSON and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.*** Marco Bracamonte-Palma (Bracamonte-Palma), a native and citizen of

* Todd Blanche is substituted as Acting Attorney General pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)’s dismissal of his appeal from an Immigration Judge (IJ)’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), based on his violation of a protection order under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. . . .” Garcia- Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). “We review de novo the BIA’s determination of purely legal questions, including the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. . . .” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We deny the petition.

Although Chevron1 deference was essentially eliminated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024), we have subsequently concluded that when an agency “has not promulgated a new interpretation of the statute to prompt us to reconsider our precedent,” such as here, we remain bound by our prior precedent “that relied on the Chevron framework.” Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412).

In Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2019), we applied Chevron deference in concluding that the categorical approach does not apply to the determination of “whether [a non-citizen’s] violation of a protection order

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

2 23-970 under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) renders him convicted of an offense under § 1229b(b)(1)(C).” This precedent forecloses Bracamonte-Palma’s challenge to his conviction. In Diaz-Quirazco, we determined that “[t]he BIA sufficiently reviewed the evidence in the record,” id. at 847, and that the evidence reviewed “reliably evinced that Diaz-Quirazco’s offense was a direct violation of the ‘no contact’ portion of the Restraining Order, which had been issued for the purpose of protecting [the victim] ‘against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury’ to her and her child.” Id. We determined that “the BIA fully considered the necessary steps for determining whether Diaz-Quirazco was ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a violation of the Restraining Order.” Id. Thus, we concluded that “the BIA’s decision can be sustained upon its reasoning.” Id. at 848.

Here, the BIA reviewed the record evidence that Bracamonte-Palma violated an order of protection entered for the safety of the victim, including a police report documenting that incident. Contrary to Bracamonte-Palma’s argument, the police report is reliable and probative evidence of the underlying factual circumstances of his offense of conviction. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41-43 (2009); see also Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The sole test for admission of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair. . . .”) (citation omitted). The Arizona court minutes confirm

3 23-970 that Bracamonte-Palma pled guilty to violating a court order. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2810. Because his wife was the victim of that violation, his violation of the court order qualified as a domestic violence offense. Moreover, the plea agreement specifically states that the factual basis for the plea was “contained in DR # 18-092124,” which is the report number for the police report. Thus, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the “Arizona court found” that Bracamonte-Palma “violated the portion of a protection order that involve[d] protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). The BIA committed no error in deciding that Bracamonte-Palma’s conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal. See Diaz-Quirazco, 931 F.3d at 848.

PETITION DENIED.

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