Halousek v. State of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHEILA HALOUSEK, No. 25-941 D.C. No. 4:23-cv-03984-YGR Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* STATE OF CALIFORNIA; SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, Gordon D. Schaber Sacramento County Courthouse; William R. Ridgeway Family Relations Courthouse; YUBA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT; CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD DISTRICT; Judge RAYMOND M. CADEI; ROBIE, Acting Presiding Judge 3rd District Court of Appeal; Judge HOCH; Judge MAURO; Judge RAYE; Judge STEPHEN W. BERRIER; KATHLEEN R. O’CONNER, Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division; DEBRA L. GIVENS, Judge of the Appellate Division; BRIAN R. ARONSON, Judge of the Appellate Division; DANNY LEE HAUKEDALEN, Court Commissioner, Defendants - Appellees.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 26, 2026** Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Sheila Halousek appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional and statutory claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Halousek’s claims against state court judges and a state court commissioner as barred by judicial immunity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to whether an act is judicial in nature and subject to absolute judicial immunity); see also Moore v. Urquhart, 899 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “Section 1983 . . . provides judicial officers immunity from injunctive relief even when the common law would not”); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying judicial immunity to court commissioner acting in a judicial capacity).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 25-941 The district court properly dismissed Halousek’s remaining § 1983 claims because Halousek filed her complaint outside the applicable statute of limitations.

See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (setting forth a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “[f]ederal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations from personal-injury claims”).

The district court properly dismissed Halousek’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242 because § 242 is “criminal statute[] that do[es] not give rise to civil liability.” Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.

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