Martin v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DANIEL B. MARTIN, No. 25-6043 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:25-cv-04382-RFL v. MEMORANDUM* INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, MATES & PILOTS; MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY, INC., Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Rita F. Lin, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 10, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: GOULD, NGUYEN, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Daniel Martin appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to remand to state court his putative state-law assault claim against International Organization

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of Masters, Mates & Pilots (“the Union”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo “issues of subject matter jurisdiction and denials of motions to remand removed cases.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1998). “[W]e have an independent obligation to ensure that both the district court and this court have subject-matter jurisdiction.” Moe v. GEICO Indem.

Co., 73 F.4th 757, 761 (9th Cir. 2023).

Federal district courts have removal jurisdiction over cases over which federal district courts “have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In general, “a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).

“One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule developed in the case law, however, is that Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.” Id. at 63–64. Our precedent holds that “complete preemption applies when Congress ‘(1) intended to displace a state-law cause of action, and (2) provided a substitute cause of action.’” Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 2020)).

1. Through section 9(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), Congress intended to displace state-law causes of action alleging

2 25-6043 breaches of a labor union’s representative duties owed to its members. Claims under section 301 of the LMRA are completely preempted because any claim “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” is “purely a creature of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Const. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1983); see also Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968). The Supreme Court has held that breach-of-duty-of-fair-representation claims are similarly defined by federal law. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188–89, 193 (1967). And it has observed that rules for duty-of-fair-representation claims should be influenced by the policy goals of federal labor law. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (noting that “state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law”). Additionally, considering the close relationship between duty-of-fair-representation claims and claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement under section 301, especially in the context of hybrid claims, it makes sense that Congress would treat them identically for purposes of federal jurisdiction. See id. at 164–65.

2. Through the duty of fair representation, Congress “provided a substitute cause of action” for preempted state-law claims alleging breaches of labor unions’ representative duties. Cnty. of San Mateo, 32 F.4th at 748 (citation omitted). Here, Martin alleged that the Union deliberately “conspired” with Matson Navigation

3 25-6043 Company, Inc. (“Matson”) “to coerce … Martin to violate his rights to bodily integrity” by instituting the vaccination requirement. If this allegation is true, then Martin would likely have a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation. See Beck v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 99, 506 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A union breaches its duty of fair representation when its ‘conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190)). And courts have power to remedy such breaches. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 196. Thus, Congress has supplied Martin with a “substitute cause of action,” and both elements of the County of San Mateo test for complete preemption are satisfied. 32 F.4th at 748 (citation omitted); cf. City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 908 (finding no substitute cause of action where there was no “federal claim or cause of action” for the state-law claim and where the federal statute did not allow for the “compensatory damages” allowed under state law).

3. The district court did not err in determining that Martin’s state-law claim against the Union, as alleged in both the state-court complaint and the amended complaint, was preempted by the duty of fair representation. “The federal statutory duty which unions owe their members to represent them fairly … displaces state law that would impose duties upon unions by virtue of their status as the workers’ exclusive collective bargaining representative.” Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531,

4 25-6043 (9th Cir. 2008). “To bring a successful state law action, aggrieved workers must make a showing of additional duties, if they exist, beyond the normal incidents of the union-employee relationship.” Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 374 (1990)). Here, the gravamen of Martin’s claim against the Union is that the Union “exerted coercive pressure upon … Martin to accept unwanted medical treatment by threatening his livelihood.” The Union was in a position to exert this pressure only because Martin was a Union member and the Union, on behalf of its membership, negotiated with Matson to “institute[] a [r]equirement … that no [m]ember could be dispatched to a Matson vessel” without being vaccinated. Like the plaintiffs in Adkins, who also sought to level an intentional-tort claim against their union, Martin takes issue with how the Union “carrie[d] out its representational functions” and seeks redress through a state-law intentional-tort claim. Id. at 541–42.

AFFIRMED.

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