United States v. Mauri

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-931 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 9:24-cr-00015-DLC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* BRETT MAURI, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 12, 2026** Portland, Oregon Before: CHRISTEN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Brett Mauri appeals his convictions for money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

“We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on void

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. for vagueness grounds.” United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2001). “The presumption is that a statute is constitutional,” and “[s]tatutes are construed to avoid defects which would render them unconstitutional.” United States v. Harris, 185 F.3d 999, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 1999). “We review de novo questions of federal constitutional law.” United States v. Kaczynski, 551 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009).

1. Mauri argues that his money laundering convictions should be overturned because 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is “unconstitutionally vague, in that it is so broad that it did not provide [him] adequate notice.”1 “A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it is ‘not sufficiently clear to provide guidance to citizens concerning how they can avoid violating it and to provide authorities with principles governing enforcement.’” United States v. Zhi Yong Guo, 634 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 2006)). When a defendant challenges a statute as applied to his own conduct, the vagueness inquiry “turns on whether the statute provided adequate notice to him that his particular conduct was proscribed.” United States v. Harris, 705 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2013).

The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 provided adequate notice to Mauri that it is illegal to engage in large financial transactions with funds that he knows are derived from crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), (f)(1)–(3); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1961(1)(B). Mauri’s conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute. Indeed, as the evidence showed at trial, Mauri engaged in two transactions involving more than $10,000 in funds that he knew were derived from his own scheme to defraud. Because Mauri had actual notice that his conduct was prohibited, we decline to set aside his money laundering convictions for vagueness.

See United States v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a conviction will not be set aside for vagueness if the defendant had adequate notice because “there is no due process problem”).

2. Mauri also argues that that his money laundering convictions merged with his wire fraud convictions. But Mauri’s money laundering was not “a central component of” his criminal scheme. See United States v. Bush, 626 F.3d 527, 535 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2009)). At trial, the government established that the purpose of Mauri’s overall scheme was to attract new clients who entrusted him with their money and believed he would build them a custom home in return. The evidence also showed that Mauri never intended to finish these projects as promised. While the

See Bush, 626 F.3d at 535.

3. To the extent Mauri advances a double jeopardy challenge, it is meritless because the two statutes at issue involve different elements. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1343, with 18 U.S.C. § 1957. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).

AFFIRMED.