Brandon Cuellar Cabrera v. Todd Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRANDON ISAIAS CUELLAR No. 19-73173 CABRERA, Agency No.

A209-398-594 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 26, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: FORREST, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Brandon Isaias Cuellar Cabrera, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition.

1. Forfeiture. Failure to “make any argument” or “meaningfully challenge” a determination in an opening brief constitutes forfeiture. See Santana- Gonzalez v. Bondi, 172 F.4th 736, 741–42 (9th Cir. 2026). Here, Cuellar Cabrera’s Opening Brief did not make any argument challenging the BIA’s determinations that his proposed particular social group (PSG) of “Salvadoran youths who are resistant to gang recruitment and membership” is not legally cognizable; that he is ineligible for withholding of removal; or that he is ineligible for CAT protection.1 Therefore, Cuellar Cabrera has forfeited his ability to seek relief on these bases.

2. Asylum. Cuellar Cabrera seeks asylum based on a second PSG: “immediate family members of Salvadoran youth who are resistant to gang recruitment.” A petitioner seeking asylum based on his membership in a PSG “must show a nexus between h[is] past harms or feared future harm and h[is] statutorily protected characteristics.” See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2023). That is, he must demonstrate that his membership in the PSG is “‘one central reason’ for either h[is] past harms or h[is] feared future harms.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ and adds its own reasoning, “we review both the BIA’s decision and the portions of the IJ’s decision adopted by the BIA.” Diaz v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the agency’s factual findings, including a persecutor’s motive, for substantial evidence. Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1018; see also Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 539 (2026). Under that standard, the agency’s findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Edgar G.C. v. Garland, 136 F.4th 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Cuellar Cabrera asserts that he was threatened by Barrio 18 gang members exclusively because of his relationship with his two brothers, who had both rebuffed the gang’s recruitment efforts. But the BIA concluded that Cuellar Cabrera was threatened because the gang was trying to recruit him, not because of his connection to his brothers. The record does not compel a contrary conclusion. Cuellar Cabrera’s family testified that Barrio 18 gang members controlled the area and recruited and threatened “everybody.” See Santana-Gonzalez, 172 F.4th at 743 (reasoning that petitioner could not establish the requisite nexus between threats and any protected ground where he “conceded that [members of a vigilante group] were probably pressuring ‘everyone’ to join”). Substantial evidence supports that the Barrio 18 gang members’ identifying Cuellar Cabrera, Johalmo, and Alfredo as brothers was “simply an instrumentality for the [gang members] to accomplish [their] goals” of controlling the area, monitoring potential recruits, and threatening local young men to join the gang once they came of age. Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1019 n.2. As such, Cuellar Cabrera cannot demonstrate the necessary nexus between his past or feared future harms and his proposed PSG, rendering him ineligible for asylum.2 See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016).

PETITION DENIED.