Brown v. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN BROWN; MAVERICK No. 25-790 CONSULTING GROUP, LLC, D.C. No.

2:24-cv-05152-SVW-JPR Petitioners - Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM* LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER; LOS ANGELES OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY; PANDORA CONSULTING ASSOCIATES, LLC,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 9, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.***

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***

The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

Marvin Brown and his company, Maverick Consulting Group, LLC (“Maverick”), appeal the district court’s dismissal of their action against the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (“LADWP”) and Pandora Consulting Associates, LLC (“Pandora”) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and California law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.1

1. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal for failure to comply with a court order. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Maverick after it failed to comply with the court order to retain counsel within thirty days. “It is a longstanding rule that ‘[c]orporations and other unincorporated associations must appear in court through an attorney.’” D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2004); see also C.D. Cal. Loc. R. 83-2.2.2 (“No organization or entity of any other kind (including . . . limited liability corporations . . . ) may appear in any action or proceeding unless represented by an attorney permitted to practice before this Court.”). “Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). After Brown and Maverick filed this action pro se, the district court gave Maverick thirty days to retain counsel in compliance with local rule or be dismissed. Maverick did not comply, explain its failure to comply, or seek an extension to retain counsel. The district court dismissed Maverick and did not grant leave to add Maverick back in any subsequent order.2

2. Brown concedes on appeal that “[he] does not have standing.” See Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] shareholder does not have standing to redress an injury to the corporation” unless it is “injured directly and independently of the corporation.”). Because the district did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Maverick, and Brown as the only remaining plaintiff lacks standing, the district court properly dismissed this case.

3. The district court also correctly held that Brown failed to state a claim for his federal claims. We review a grant of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2008). Brown did not address the district court’s dismissal of his federal claims on the merits in his opening brief, so any challenge is forfeited. Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The usual rule is that arguments . . . omitted from the opening brief are deemed forfeited.”).

Having “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” the district court properly “decline[d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over Brown’s state law claims.3 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

AFFIRMED.4