Zavalza-Uribe v. Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUAN ZAVALZA-URIBE, No. 22-2032 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-191-438 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted July 10, 2026 Portland, Oregon Before: GRABER, BERZON, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Juan Zavalza-Uribe,1 a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reconsider its decision denying his motion to reopen his application for cancellation of removal. We deny the petition.

1. To the extent that Petitioner challenges the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen, the petition is untimely, so we decline to consider his arguments.

See Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 274–75 (2025) (holding that the thirty-day deadline for filing a petition for review is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule); Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced if properly raised by a party).

The BIA’s decision denying reopening issued on September 22, 2022, and Petitioner filed his petition for review more than thirty days later.

2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating the standard of review).

a. The BIA adequately explained its decision to deny reconsideration of its denial of reopening. The BIA must consider the relevant evidence and explain the basis for its decision, see Franco-Rosendo v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the abuse of discretion standard for a motion to reopen), but “the BIA ‘does not have to write an exegesis on every contention,’” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The BIA reiterated its earlier determination that Petitioner was not likely to establish the

2 22-2032 level of hardship required to receive cancellation of removal. In turn, the decision denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen reflects that the BIA considered evidence of his daughter’s mental health diagnoses and treatment, along with the record as a whole.

b. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by determining that Petitioner failed to establish prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating reasons for denying a motion to reopen). Petitioner’s motion to reconsider challenged the BIA’s evaluation of his evidence, but not the legal standard that the BIA used. We therefore do not consider whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (discussing the requirement of exhaustion).2 And, as a factual matter, the BIA’s evaluation of Petitioner’s evidence of potential hardship was not arbitrary or irrational. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing the abuse of discretion standard).

PETITION DENIED.