Rodriguez-Garcia v. Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FEBE RODRIGUEZ-GARCIA; ERIC No. 22-1259 EVERALDO DUQUE-RODRIGUEZ; Agency Nos. ALISON YURITZY DUQUE- A209-392-061 RODRIGUEZ, A209-392-062 A209-392-063 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 31, 2026** Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and WARDLAW and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Febe Rodriguez Garcia (“Rodriguez”) and her minor children (together, “Petitioners”) seek review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition for review in part, deny it in part, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

“When the BIA reviews the IJ’s decision de novo, ‘our review is limited to the BIA’s decision except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.’”

Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021)). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788, (9th Cir. 2022).

1. Procedural bars foreclose the merits of Rodriguez’s petition. First, Rodriguez forfeited review of the no-nexus determination, which is dispositive of her asylum and withholding-of-removal claims. Both claims require a causal relationship, or nexus, between a persecutory harm and a protected ground. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–58 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, the BIA and IJ found no such nexus. Rodriguez fails to challenge this dispositive finding.

Instead, Rodriguez raises arguments concerning credibility, past persecution, and fear of future persecution. We do not address these contentions because the BIA did not deny relief on these grounds. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820,

2 22-1259 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2. In her opening brief, Rodriguez does not contest the BIA’s determination that Rodriguez waived any challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT protection. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013).

3. We remand to the BIA to consider whether a claims-processing violation occurred in light of the defective Notice to Appear (“NTA”) issued by the Government. We have granted petitions for review and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings in materially similar circumstances. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629–32 (9th Cir. 2024). Contrary to the Government’s arguments, Rodriguez exhausted this issue by raising it before the IJ in her Motion to Terminate, and before the BIA in her appellate brief. As in Suate-Orellana, Rodriguez argued that “the NTA was statutorily deficient and that, as a result, the IJ lacked jurisdiction.” Id. at 629. We thus remand “to allow the BIA to consider the impact of subsequent case law in the first instance.” Id. at 630.

PETITION GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, AND REMANDED.1