Neal v. Neal

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: NATALIA ALEKSANDROVNA No. 25-5719 NEAL D.C. No. 24-1134 Debtor ___________________________________ MEMORANDUM* SHARON ELIZABETH NEAL, Appellant. v. NATALIA ALEKSANDROVNA NEAL, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for Oregon Gan, Brand, and Lafferty, III, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding Submitted July 31, 2026** Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Creditor Sharon Elizabeth Neal (S. Neal) appeals pro se the Bankruptcy

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Appellate Panel’s (BAP) decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders denying her motions to dismiss the Chapter 13 case of debtor Natalia Aleksandrovna Neal (Debtor) and denying her renewed motion to dismiss, which the bankruptcy court construed as a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.1 We review de novo BAP decisions and apply the same standard of review that BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. In re Boyajian, 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We review for abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision on whether to dismiss a case. In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Marsch, 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” In re Onecast Media, Inc., 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Kaypro, 218 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the bankruptcy court applies an incorrect legal standard or its factual findings are illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. See TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver, Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying S. Neal’s motions to dismiss. See In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d at 1222. S. Neal argues that Debtor’s stipulation to the judgment in the state court action constitutes a material default under the confirmed Chapter 13 plan and therefore the district court erred in denying her motions to dismiss. But the bankruptcy court applied the appropriate legal standard and gave the following legitimate reasons for concluding that dismissal was not warranted: (1) the stipulation “indicate[s] that the loan remains in full force and effect”; (2) the stipulation “[does not] increase in any way the amount of debt that the Debtor had”; (3) “Debtor fully disclosed . . . th[e] property and the debt during the course of the bankruptcy”; and (4) Debtor “has not incurred additional debt by virtue of th[e] stipulation.” See TrafficSchool.com, 653 F.3d at 832. The bankruptcy court’s reasoning and decision is fully supported by the record. Indeed, the record supports the conclusion that Debtor fully disclosed her interest in the property and the underlying debt in her schedules. And the record further supports the conclusion that the stipulated judgment merely returns Debtor and U.S. Bank Trust National Association to their previous positions and Debtor has not incurred any additional debt. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Debtor’s stipulation to the judgment in the state court action did not constitute a material default under the confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

2. The bankruptcy court did not err in construing S. Neal’s renewed

AFFIRMED.