Mayne v. Frazer Ryan Goldberg & Arnold, LLP

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LINDA FURST MAYNE, AKA Linda No. 25-5540 Furst Mayne, D.C. No. 4:25-cv-00323-KAW Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* FRAZER RYAN GOLDBERG & ARNOLD, LLP; JOHN R. FITZPATRICK; T.J. RYAN; JAMES W. RYAN; JOSHUA MOYA; BARBARA BERMAN; MARILYN CAGE, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Kandis A. Westmore, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted July 31, 2026** Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Linda Furst Mayne appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

1. The district court erred in dismissing Mayne’s claims for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mayne complains “of a legal injury caused by an adverse party,” as opposed to a “legal injury caused by a state court judgment.” Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. 2. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court’s judgment because Mayne’s claims are time-barred. See Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc., 816 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “we may affirm on any ground supported by the record” when reviewing a district court’s dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(1)). Although Mayne frames her injury as a breach of contract, the gravamen of her complaint is that Defendants were negligent in rendering their professional services in July 2019. See Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 943 P.2d 747, 755 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that a breach of contract action “cannot be maintained if the contract merely requires generally that the professional render services”). Mayne’s claims are thus subject to Arizona’s two-year limitations

2 25-5540 period.1 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542; Keonjian v. Olcott, 169 P.3d 927, 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that “claims for professional malpractice are generally tort claims” that are subject to the two-year limitations period). Because Mayne did not file her complaint until January 2025, her claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and amendment would be futile.2 See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 718 n.20 (9th Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.