Gelazela v. USA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK ALAN GELAZELA, No. 25-2277 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:21-cv-01499-JLT-EPG v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THOMAS MOORE, Defendants - Appellees, and DOUGLAS WHITE, Warden, D.

BOLCHER, C. LEPE, K.

LEHMAN, OGADEN, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 31, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Mark Gelazela appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgement for the United States and Doctor Thomas Moore. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 562 (9th Cir. 2009), we affirm.

1. The district court properly granted summary judgment for the United States because Gelazela’s Federal Torts Claim Act claim (“FTCA”) was untimely.

An FTCA “claim is timely only if it has been: (1) submitted to the appropriate federal agency within two years of accrual and (2) filed in federal court within six months of the agency’s final denial.” Redlin v. United States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2019); see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The Bureau of Prisons mailed Gelazela notice that his claim was denied on March 8, 2021. Gelazela filed his complaint in this action on October 8, 2021—exactly one month after the statute of limitations ran on September 8, 2021. Gelazela’s FTCA claim was not tolled because the tolling provision for legal disabilities in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) does not apply to tort claims against the government under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Booth v. United States, 914 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We therefore reject [the plaintiff’s] argument that the tolling provision in subsection (a) should apply to claims covered by subsection (b).”). Additionally, Gelazela is not entitled to equitable tolling, see United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 420 (2015) (“[T]he FTCA’s time

2 25-2277 bars are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling.”); Redlin, 921 F.3d at 1140, because he did not pursue his claim with reasonable diligence, see Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that the plaintiff did not diligently pursue his claim and was not entitled to equitable tolling when he filed other legal documents in the same period). Because Gelazela filed this complaint one month past the statute of limitations, Gelazela’s claim was “forever barred” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

2. The district court properly granted summary judgment for Dr. Moore because Gelazela failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.1 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To satisfy this high standard, Gelazela must demonstrate that “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to [his] pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Although it is undisputed that Gelazela had serious medical needs, Gelazela failed to provide evidence to show that Dr. Moore’s mental culpability exceeded mere negligence.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Because negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference, Gelazela did not establish a constitutional violation.2 3. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to consider Gelazela’s surreplies. See U.S. ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009). Under the applicable local rules, “[a]fter a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers, or other materials may be filed without prior Court approval,” except for in limited circumstances not applicable here.

E.D. Cal. R. 230(m). Gelazela filed surreplies without leave of the court and did not identify any valid reasons for filing surreplies. While the district court was required to treat Gelazela with leniency as a pro se litigant, that lenience does not require a court to allow surreplies. And, in any event, the arguments in the surreplies do not change our analysis of the underlying merits of Gelazela’s claims.

AFFIRMED.