Altiero v. County of Spokane

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KELLY ALTIERO, wife and the marital No. 25-1588 community comprised thereof; et al., D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00211-RLP Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF SPOKANE; JOHNATHAN DURBIN, Animal Protection Officer in both his individual and official capacity; Field Operations Manager ASHLEY PROSZEK, in both her individual and official capacity; OZZIE KNEZOVICH, Spokane County Sheriff; SPOKANE COUNTY REGIONAL ANIMAL PROTECTION SERVICE; SPOKANE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Deputies' John and Jane Does 1-10 in both their official and individual capacities, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Rebecca L. Pennell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 3, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Kelly Altiero appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Spokane County Regional Animal Protection Services Officer Johnathan Durbin and Field Operations Manager Ashley Proszek based on qualified immunity. Altiero also purports to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her municipal liability claim based on negligent training and supervision against the County of Spokane, and her state law claims for defamation, trespass, and negligence.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We affirm.

In reviewing whether an individual is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we must engage in a two-step inquiry asking first, “whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the [officers] violated a constitutional right,” and second, “whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014) (per curiam)). It is within our “sound discretion [to decide] which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

1. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Altiero’s unlawful search claim because even if Officer Durbin’s actions constitute a search, Altiero fails to cite any precedent that would clearly establish her constitutional right at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 887. 2 2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity on Altiero’s procedural due process claim under Wash. Rev. Code 16.52.085(2) (2020). The district court correctly determined RCW 16.52.085(2) (2020) leaves it to the officer’s discretion whether an examination by a veterinarian is necessary before seizure. See RCW 16.52.085(2) (2020) (“the officer may authorize an examination of a domestic animal allegedly neglected or abused in violation of this chapter by a veterinarian” (emphasis added)). Further, Altiero fails to cite any precedent that would clearly establish her constitutional right for this procedural due process claim. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 887.

3. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity on Altiero’s procedural due process claim predicated on a failure to provide notice prior to the euthanization of the horse, “Melvin.” Exercising our discretion to do so, we decide this claim at qualified immunity’s second step because Altiero fails to cite any precedent that would clearly establish her constitutional right for this procedural due process claim. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 887.

AFFIRMED.