Singh v. Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AMRITPAL SINGH, No. 24-1509 Agency No. A216-266-016 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 13, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: LEE, MENDOZA, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Amritpal Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning and supplements that reasoning with its own analysis, we review both decisions to the extent the BIA relied on the grounds the IJ considered. Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review legal questions de novo and factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence. Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014).

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Singh’s testimony not only contradicted itself but also the information contained in his applications for relief, and these inconsistencies did not merely involve trivial facts. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility finding where the petitioner’s testimony regarding his alleged persecution contradicted his declaration); Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]nconsistencies regarding events that form the basis of the asylum claim are sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination.”). The IJ, as affirmed by the BIA, also reasonably rejected Singh’s alleged confusion as an explanation for these inconsistencies because he was given ample opportunity to clarify his testimony and, instead, reaffirmed these inconsistencies before ultimately retracting them. See Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022) (“But if the noncitizen does not provide a plausible explanation, or if the IJ reasonably rejects the proffered explanation, the IJ may rely on that inconsistency to make an adverse credibility determination.”). Further, Singh’s testimony contained a far “more compelling” narrative than his applications for relief, which further supports the adverse credibility determination. Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[O]missions are probative of credibility to the extent that later disclosures, if credited, would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum application.”).

2. Singh does not challenge the agency’s determination that the documentary evidence neither rehabilitated his testimony nor independently met his burden of proof, rendering these arguments waived. See Castro-Perez, 409 F.3d at 1072. And “[w]ithout credible testimony or sufficient corroborating evidence,” Singh cannot satisfy his burden of proof to show eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020).

PETITION DENIED.

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