Veronica Crespin De Savery v. Todd Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT VERONICA MATILDE CRESPIN DE No. 20-71942 SAVERY; MONICA ALEJANDRA MANCIA CRESPIN, Agency Nos. A202-177-976 A202-177-977 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 14, 2026** Reno, Nevada Before: BADE, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Veronica Matilde Crespin de Savery and Monica Alejandra Mancia Crespin (together, “Crespin”), natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of their motion to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. reopen proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

To prevail in a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that her “counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective,” and (2) that she was “prejudiced by [her] counsel’s performance.”

Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish prejudice, Crespin “must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was so inadequate that it ‘may have affected the outcome of the proceedings.’” Id. (citation omitted).

We review “[q]uestions of law, including claims of due process violations due to ineffective assistance” of counsel, de novo. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2005).

Crespin fails to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her former counsel’s failure to designate a particular social group. This failure cannot have affected proceedings unless there is some factual evidence that would support a nexus between the harm feared and the particular social group she would have designated.

See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2023). At her original hearing, Crespin described only fears of general gang and criminal activity and disclaimed any knowledge of the reason that she was targeted by extortionists.

These facts do not support a nexus to any protected ground. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). And her motion to reopen did not include any new

2 20-71942 evidence that might lead to a different conclusion. Thus, the BIA did not err in determining that Crespin suffered no prejudice from her former counsel’s default.

PETITION DENIED.

3 20-71942