Singh v. Blanche

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SATPAL SINGH, Nos. 24-7373, 25-6506

Agency No. A209-943-024 Petitioner-Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,

Respondent-Appellee.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 14, 2026 San Francisco, California

Before: LEE, MENDOZA, JR., and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Satpal Singh (“Petitioner”) seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) November 15, 2024, decision dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and the BIA’s October 9, 2025, decision denying his motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny both petitions.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (reviewing the BIA’s adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence). Although Petitioner argues that the inconsistencies identified by the agency did not concern the alleged persecution itself, the REAL ID Act permits an immigration judge to rely on inconsistencies bearing on credibility, whether or not they go to the heart of the claim. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2024).

Here, the IJ identified numerous inconsistencies between Petitioner’s testimony and documentary evidence relating to his 2008 nonimmigrant visa application. Petitioner initially testified that he had never applied for a visitor visa to the United States. After being confronted with the visa records, however, he admitted that he had in fact applied for a visa. Petitioner also initially denied ever appearing for a visa interview before later conceding that he had appeared in person. Likewise, Petitioner testified that he had never traveled outside India prior to his 2017 entry into the United States, but eventually admitted that he had lived in Malaysia for several years after being confronted with the visa records. The agency also noted inconsistencies regarding Petitioner’s claimed marital history and the information reflected in the visa records.

The agency was permitted to consider these inconsistencies in the totality of the circumstances in evaluating Petitioner’s credibility. See Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“There is no bright-line rule under which some number of inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an adverse credibility determination—our review will always require assessing the totality of the circumstances.”). The agency reasonably viewed Petitioner’s repeated denials followed by admissions after confrontation with documentary evidence as undermining his overall credibility. See Kumar, 18 F.4th at 1155 (“[F]alsehoods and fabrications weigh particularly heavily in the adverse credibility inquiry.”).

Petitioner argues that the agency placed undue weight on events surrounding a failed visa application filed nearly a decade before the alleged persecution. But under the substantial evidence standard, we may not reweigh the evidence. See Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 366 (2021). The question is whether the record compels a contrary conclusion, and here it does not.

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal independent of his discredited testimony. The IJ found that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence establishing his claims. The BIA concluded that Petitioner did not meaningfully challenge that determination on administrative appeal and deemed the issue waived. Petitioner has not demonstrated reversible error in that conclusion. Because the adverse credibility determination stands and the corroboration finding provides an independent basis for denial, the agency properly denied asylum and withholding of removal. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that an applicant “can be turned down for failing to provide corroboration where he does have it or could reasonably obtain it”).

Any challenge to the denial of CAT protection likewise fails. Before the BIA, Petitioner did not meaningfully contest the IJ’s denial of CAT relief, and the BIA deemed the issue waived. We therefore do not disturb the agency’s denial of CAT protection. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).

Petitioner also seeks review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 2014).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening. First, the BIA reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to comply fully with the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Second, the BIA reasonably determined that Petitioner failed to establish deficient performance. The BIA explained that prior counsel’s decisions concerning which issues to pursue on appeal constituted strategic litigation choices and that the right to effective assistance guarantees only reasonable competence rather than perfect advocacy.

Third, and independently, Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. The IJ denied relief principally because of the adverse credibility determination, which the BIA affirmed. The BIA reasonably concluded that Petitioner had not shown how additional briefing by prior counsel would have overcome the multiple inconsistencies supporting that determination or altered the outcome of the proceedings. Nor did Petitioner establish a basis for CAT relief independent of the discredited testimony. Because Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, and because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening, the petitions are denied.

PETITIONS DENIED. 1