Rayford v. Maxwell

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUAN MARSHALL RAYFORD; DUPREE No. 26-2279 ANTOINE GLASS, D.C. No. 5:24-cv-00473-SSS-DTB Plaintiffs - Appellees, MEMORANDUM* v. CHRISTOPHER KEELING, Defendant - Appellant, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STEVEN GROSS, GREGORY MAXWELL, DOES, to 100, Defendants.

JUAN MARSHALL RAYFORD; DUPREE No. 26-2280 ANTOINE GLASS, D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellees, 5:24-cv-00473-SSS-DTB v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CHRISTOPHER KEELING, GREGORY MAXWELL, DOES, Defendants, STEVEN GROSS, Defendant - Appellant.

JUAN MARSHALL RAYFORD; DUPREE No. 26-2283 ANTOINE GLASS, D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellees, 5:24-cv-00473-SSS-DTB v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CHRISTOPHER KEELING, STEVEN GROSS, DOES, Defendants, GREGORY MAXWELL, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted August 3, 2026 Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Individual Defendants Christopher Keeling, Steven Gross, and Gregory Maxwell appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed by Plaintiffs Juan Rayford and Dupree Glass. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and arguments underlying the instant case, we do not detail them here 2 26-2279 except as necessary for the disposition of this appeal. Having considered the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and order a limited remand. We retain jurisdiction over any subsequent appeal of the district court’s decision regarding Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity.

On an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction “to resolv[e] a defendant’s purely legal contention that his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution and, in any event, did not violate clearly established law,” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified), and to resolve whether the district court’s rulings are unsupported by any evidence, Id. at 731 n.3. We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); accord Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2018), or to resolve factual disputes, Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 791 (9th Cir. 2018). With these jurisdictional limits in mind, we turn to each of the respective Appellees’ claims.

1. Fabrication of Evidence: “To prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017). “To

We reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to Deputy Maxwell on both Plaintiffs’ fabrication of evidence claims.

There is no evidence which would support a finding that the mention of the gang “Pueblo Bishops” in his investigative report was the cause in fact of either Glass’s or Rayford’s convictions. Maxwell’s investigative report was not admitted at the preliminary hearing or trial nor was the “Pueblo Bishops” gang affiliation incorporated into the prosecutor’s theory of the case, and Maxwell did not testify.

See Richards v. County of San Bernardino, 39 F.4th 562, 574 (9th Cir. 2022) (describing the second element of a fabrication claim as a materiality inquiry in which the plaintiff must “show a reasonable likelihood that the allegedly fabricated . . . evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury”).

We remand for the district court to conduct an analysis of Deputy Gross’s and Deputy Keeling’s entitlement to qualified immunity. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the district court found a genuine dispute of

That said, the district court did not separately assess the materiality of the evidence each Defendant allegedly deliberately fabricated, or whether the allegedly fabricated evidence proximately caused each Plaintiff’s injuries. See Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798 (“To prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” (emphasis added)). Rather, it blended Defendant-and-claim-specific evidence together and

We remand to the district court with direction to articulate: (1) the factual and legal basis for each Plaintiff’s fabrication-of-evidence claim against Defendants Gross and Keeling, taking care to distinguish between claims premised on fabrication of eyewitness testimony and fabrication of gang-affiliation evidence; and (2) whether the evidence supports each element of each claim if the disputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties. In doing so, the district court shall separately address claims asserted pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

2. Brady Claim: Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as non-moving parties, we conclude Plaintiffs have failed to make out a colorable Brady claim against any of the Defendants. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999) (holding that to establish a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

3. Malicious Prosecution: We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to each of the Defendants on Plaintiff Glass’s malicious prosecution claims brought under the Fourth Amendment. “[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution.” See Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011). At the preliminary hearing, Donisha Williams testified that she saw Glass shoot at the house. Williams later testified consistently at trial. Williams’ testimony provides probable cause independent from the allegedly fabricated evidence, and, thus, defeats Glass’s malicious prosecution claims brought under the Fourth Amendment. See Lassiter, 556 F.3d at 1054–55; see also Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a malicious prosecution claim failed as a matter of law when the plaintiff was “unable to show that she was prosecuted without probable cause”).

We remand for the district court to conduct an analysis of Deputy Gross’s and Deputy Keeling’s entitlement to qualified immunity on Plaintiff Rayford’s malicious prosecution claims brought under the Fourth Amendment. Unlike Glass, no witness

Accordingly, there is no testimony in the record to provide probable cause independent from the allegedly fabricated evidence. 2 But as with Plaintiffs’ fabrication-of-evidence claims, the district court must do a detailed review of Rayford’s specific allegations against each Defendant and consider whether the record evidence raises material disputes of fact going to the elements of this cause of action. See Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1287. Because Rayford’s fabrication-of- evidence claim against Defendant Maxwell fails for lack of causation, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Maxwell on Rayford’s malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment.

To the extent Plaintiffs bring standalone malicious prosecution claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, we reverse the denial of summary judgment. We have held that “no substantive due process right exists under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from prosecution without probable cause.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing plurality and concurring opinions in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)). We “have held, post-Albright, that a § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove that the defendants acted for the purpose of depriving him of a specific constitutional right, but have not limited that right to one protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unlike Awabdy, the Plaintiffs do not allege that the Defendants conspired to deprive them of any specific constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment, such as a right to equal protection or free speech, other than the right to be free from malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a standalone basis for the Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. Id. 4. Conspiracy and Failure to Intervene: To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under § 1983, Plaintiffs must “show an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983)). There must be a “possibility that the jury can infer from the circumstances that the alleged conspirators had a meeting of the minds.” Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301–02 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, “police officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289 (citation omitted). But

Defendants’ arguments regarding the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the conspiracy and the failure to intervene claims largely exceed the scope of our review at this interlocutory stage. Marsh, 985 F.3d at 731 n.3. The district court concluded that a reasonable juror could find a “tacit agreement” among Defendants to prosecute Plaintiffs on the basis of false evidence, pointing to evidence in the record that Gross discussed the allegedly falsified FI cards with Keeling after the shooting, that Maxwell and Keeling spoke about the case after Maxwell handed it off, the failure to pursue other leads despite evidence to the contrary, inconsistencies in investigatory reports, and a defaced wanted post of Glass at the police station with devil horns drawn over the photo. Id. The district court ruled that a reasonable juror could find that a conspiracy existed between the Defendants—all of whom worked at the same police station. And if a conspiracy existed between them, a reasonable juror could conclude that each of the Defendants failed to intervene. We may not “review that evidence-sufficiency determination on appeal.” Id. at 731.

That said, we remand for the district court to conduct an analysis of the Defendants’ separate entitlement to qualified immunity as to both the conspiracy and

5. Motion for Summary Affirmance: Plaintiffs’ motion for summary affirmance is denied as moot.

The panel remands to the district court on a limited basis to reconsider its summary judgment ruling consistent with this order, and retains jurisdiction of any appeal. On remand, the district court shall articulate: (1) the factual and legal basis for each Plaintiff’s fabrication of evidence claim against Deputy Gross and Deputy Keeling, distinguishing between claims premised on fabrication of eyewitness testimony and fabrication of gang-affiliation evidence; (2) the factual and legal basis for Plaintiff Rayford’s malicious prosecution claim against Deputy Gross and Deputy Keeling under the Fourth Amendment; (3) whether the evidence supports each element of each claim if the disputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties; and (4) whether the alleged constitutional violations, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable, were clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. Our review of the district court’s order was significantly hindered by ubiquitous assertions of fact within the briefs

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED. The panel retains jurisdiction over any further appeal of this matter.