Kikkert v. Trump

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERIC JESSE KIKKERT, No. 25-6431 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:25-cv-00861-JHC v. MEMORANDUM* DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; TOM COLE, in his official capacity as Chair of the House Appropriations Committee; SUSAN COLLINS, in her official capacity as Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee; MIKE JOHNSON, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House; JOHN THUNE, in his official capacity as Senate Majority Leader, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 25, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Before: SILVERMAN, N.R. SMITH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Eric Jesse Kikkert appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging claims arising from the United States’ support for the State of Israel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Garza v. Woods, 150 F.4th 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2025). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kikkert’s action for lack of standing because Kikkert failed to allege an injury in fact. See id. (setting forth the constitutional requirements for standing, including an injury in fact); see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 592, 609 (2007) (plurality opinion) (explaining that Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing, and that Flast “has largely been confined to its facts”). However, a dismissal for lack of standing should be without prejudice. See Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson, 148 F.4th 1040, 1050 n.4 (9th Cir. 2025). We instruct the district court to amend the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of the action is without prejudice.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

2 25-6431 We do not consider issues that are not specifically and distinctly argued in the opening brief, or issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Roley v. Google LLC, 40 F.4th 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2022).

AFFIRMED with instructions to amend the judgment.

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